There were few glitches. News of the extent and cause of the blackout was available thanks to battery-powered radios, and emergency generators provided sufficient power for public address systems to notify court occupants of evacuations, to secure computer networks without crashing, and, in some instances, to operate building services, including lights and elevators.

Timing of the blackout, coming late Thursday afternoon, left courts with one business day to cope before heading into the weekend. Most courts in the blackout zone closed Friday, but Monday generally meant a return to normal operations.

In New York City, the Mayor told people to stay home Friday, and with no transit system in operation, most people heeded his advice. The White Plains courthouse in the Southern District of New York closed Friday as well. For all New York courts, business resumed Monday morning.

In Detroit, an alert to boil drinking water meant that on Monday morning the court had bottled water available for jurors. Courts in the Northern District of Ohio closed Friday, but lack of water kept courts in Cleveland and Akron closed on Monday.

The resourceful response of federal courts to the blackout was not happenstance. In fact the courts began emergency planning immediately after 9-11. Following the terrorist attacks, Administrative Office Director Leonidas Ralph Mecham wrote to all chief judges, urging the federal courts to develop OEPs and Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs). An OEP includes plans for evacuations, securing facilities and records, and communicating with employees and the public on the court's status. All of the courts in the blackout zone had OEPs in some stage of development and were able to implement them.