

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES
MINUTES
March 16-17, Orlando, Florida

I. Attendance and Preliminary Matters

The Criminal Rules Advisory Committee (“Committee”) met in Orlando, Florida on March 16-17, 2015. The following persons were in attendance:

Judge Reena Raggi, Chair
Hon. David Bitkower¹
Judge James C. Dever
Judge Gary S. Feinerman
Mark Filip, Esq.
Chief Justice David E. Gilbertson
Professor Orin S. Kerr
Judge Raymond M. Kethledge
Judge David M. Lawson
Judge Timothy R. Rice
John S. Siffert, Esq.
Professor Sara Sun Beale, Reporter
Professor Nancy J. King, Reporter
Professor Daniel R. Coquillette, Standing Committee Reporter
Judge Amy J. St. Eve, Standing Committee Liaison
James N. Hatten, Clerk of Court Liaison²

In addition, the following members participated by telephone:

Carol A. Brook, Esq.
Judge Morrison C. England, Jr.

And the following persons were present to support the Committee:

Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Rules Committee Officer and Secretary to the Committee on Practice and Procedure
Bridget M. Healy, Rules Office Attorney
Frances F. Skillman, Rules Committee Support Office
Laural L. Hooper, Federal Judicial Center

¹ The Department of Justice was also represented throughout the meeting by Jonathan Wroblewski, Director of the Criminal Division’s Office of Policy & Legislation.

² Mr. Hatten was present only on March 17.

II. CHAIR'S REMARKS AND OPENING BUSINESS

A. Chair's Remarks

Judge Raggi introduced Rebecca Womeldorf, the new Rules Committee Officer and Secretary to the Committee on Practice and Procedure. She welcomed observers Peter Goldberger of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Robert Welsh of the American College of Trial Lawyers. She also thanked all of the staff members who made the arrangements for the meeting and the hearings.

B. Minutes of November 2014 Meeting

Judge Raggi reminded Committee members that the minutes, which were included in the Agenda Book, were approved last fall before their inclusion in the Agenda Book for the Standing Committee's January meeting.

III. CRIMINAL RULES ACTIONS

A. Proposed Amendment to Rule 41

Judge Kethledge, chair of the Rule 41 Subcommittee, reported on the history of the proposed amendment, the Subcommittee's review of the responses submitted during the public comment period, and its recommendations.

In September 2013 the Department of Justice came to the Advisory Committee with two problems. The current version of Rule 41 provides (1) no venue to apply for a warrant to search a computer whose physical location is unknown because of anonymizing technology, and (2) only a cumbersome procedure to apply for warrants to search computers that have been damaged by botnets that extend over many districts. Judge Kethledge emphasized these are procedural—not substantive—problems. The Department proposed an amendment to address these procedural problems.

In April 2014, the Advisory Committee significantly revised the Justice Department's original proposal, crafting a narrowly tailored proposed amendment that closely tracked the contours of the two problems that gave rise to it. The Standing Committee approved the publication of the proposed amendment for public comment.

The Rule 41 Subcommittee received and gave careful consideration to the public comments, including more than 40 written comments and three additional memoranda from the Department of Justice. Several hours of public comments were also presented at hearings before the full Advisory Committee in November 2014. The Subcommittee then held three conference calls in which it discussed the testimony, the written comments, the Department's memoranda, and its own concerns about some of the language of the published amendment.

After careful consideration, the Subcommittee unanimously recommended that the Advisory Committee approve several proposed revisions to the amendment as published, and

approve the revised amendment for transmittal to the Standing Committee.

Judge Kethledge summarized the issues raised in the public comments before stating the Subcommittee's specific recommendations for revisions.

In general, the concerns of those opposing the amendment are substantive, not procedural. Commenters argued that searches conducted under the proposed amendment would not satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, or would be conducted in an unreasonably destructive manner, or would violate Title III's restrictions on wiretaps. These are all substantive concerns on which the amendment expressly takes no position. The amendment leaves these issues for the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis, applying the Fourth Amendment to each application for a warrant.

Similarly, arguments that any changes should be left to Congress are unpersuasive. Venue is not substance. It is process, and Congress has authorized the courts "to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure." This amendment would be an exercise of that authority. Judge Kethledge noted that the Department of Justice had acted in conformity with Judicial Conference policy by using the Rules Enabling Act for these procedural issues rather than going to Congress.

The Department came to the Committee with a procedural problem that is impairing its ability to investigate serious computer crimes that are occurring now. Judge Kethledge respectfully submitted that it would be irresponsible for the Advisory Committee not to provide a venue for the government to make a showing to a judicial officer as to the lawfulness of these searches. He then invited other members of the Subcommittee (Judge Dever, Judge Lawson, Judge Rice, Mr. Filip, Professor Kerr, and the representatives of the Department of Justice) to comment.

Subcommittee members noted that the deliberative process had worked well: the proposed amendment had been narrowed to address the problems created by the current rule, and all of the comments had been reviewed and considered with great care. They expressed support for the amendment (with the proposed revisions to be discussed), and agreed that it addresses procedural—not substantive—issues. One member noted that a proposed revision to be discussed later in the meeting, using the term "venue" in the caption, may help to make this clear to the public. Responding to the concern that these matters should be left to Congress, Judge Raggi commented that under the Rules Enabling Act, Congress will necessarily play a significant role: any proposed amendment must be submitted to Congress before it can go into effect.

Professor Beale stated that the proposed amendment also includes provisions describing how notice of remote electronic searches is to be given. This portion of the proposed amendment will be applicable to all remote electronic searches, including those now being made under Rule 41 when the location of the device to be searched is known. The current notice provisions of Rule 41 are not well adapted to searches of this nature, because they refer to leaving a copy of the warrant and a receipt "at the place where the officer took the property." She noted that some of the comments focused on the adequacy of the proposed notice provisions, and that several of the

Subcommittee's proposed revisions of the amendment concerned the notice provisions.

Professor Beale thanked Ms. Healy for her work in the preparation of the agenda book, and noted that members had before them a hard copy replacement for one tab in the section on Rule 41.

Judge Raggi noted that the Subcommittee members and the staff had worked heroically to review the large number of comments received, including many at the very end of the comment period, and to prepare the agenda book under significant time constraints due to the short interval between the end of the comment period and the date for publication of the Agenda Book. Judge Kethledge concurred and also thanked the reporters.

Judge Raggi then invited comments from members not on the Rule 41 Subcommittee, asking members to focus first on the general issues raised by the proposed amendment. She confirmed that the members on the telephone could hear all of the discussion.

One member, acknowledging the care and hard work that had gone into the drafting and revision of the proposed amendment, nonetheless opposed it, raising concerns heard from the defense community as well as those who filed public comments. The member disagreed with the characterization of this as a procedural rule, arguing that it has too many substantive effects to be regarded as merely procedural. In effect, it opens the door to judges making ex parte decisions about core privacy concerns, and the defense does not participate until too late in the process, in back-end litigation. This is too great a risk. Authority tends to expand, and it is not possible to predict exactly how this authority will develop. Given the importance of the privacy concerns and the many unknowns, it is preferable for Congress to act first, as it did in Title III. In this member's view, the commenters who opposed did not misunderstand the amendment, because the result will not be narrow. In response to an observation that the defense role would be the same under the amendment as it would be for all other searches, the member expressed the view that the privacy concerns are greater here. For many people, computers are their lives, and these privacy concerns should be considered by Congress.

Another member said he was not hearing the same concerns from the criminal defense bar. He emphasized the public's interest in protections against new ways criminals can use technology to jeopardize the economy, national security, and individual privacy by identity theft, terrorism, corporate espionage, child pornography, and other serious offenses. Defense lawyers agree the government must be able to do its job in protecting society. For example, if a trade secret is lost, it is gone forever. The risk of such criminal activity is clear and present. In this member's view, the commenters who opposed the amendment did not recognize that the government must demonstrate probable cause to obtain a warrant, and they did not recognize the importance of affording the government a venue to show that it is entitled to a warrant to take the necessary actions to respond to these threats. There are risks that individual privacy will be invaded, but the greater risk to privacy comes from burgeoning electronic criminal activity, often shielded by anonymizing software, rather than government search warrants that must satisfy probable cause regardless of venue.

Judge Kethledge stated that it is the Committee's role and responsibility to address new problems when they arise, and this venue concern is a serious new procedural problem. There is a gap in Rule 41 that may prevent the government from obtaining a warrant because there is no way to identify the court that would have venue to consider the warrant application. The Committee should act to remedy this gap, which will allow the case law on the constitutional issues to develop in an orderly process as courts review warrant applications, rather than after the fact following warrantless searches based on exigent circumstances. If the New York Stock Exchange were to be hacked tomorrow using anonymizing software, under current Rule 41 there is no district in which the government could seek a warrant, and it would likely conduct a warrantless search under the exigent search doctrine, without prior judicial review.

Judge Raggi agreed that if the New York Stock Exchange were to be hacked by a computer using anonymizing software, it would be preferable to allow the government to seek a warrant from the court where the investigation is taking place, rather than conducting an exigent warrantless search. Concerns that judges may be uninformed about the technology to be used in the searches could be addressed by judicial education. The Federal Judicial Center has recently prepared some materials about topics such as cloud computing, and additional materials could be developed to help judges review applications for remote electronic searches.

A member observed that much of the public response is based, incorrectly, on the view that the amendment itself authorizes remote electronic searches. In fact, courts now issue such warrants under the current rules when the government knows the location of the subject computer. The only question addressed by this rule is how to proceed when anonymizing technology prevents the government from learning the computer's location so that it may go to the proper court to seek a warrant. Judge Raggi agreed, but noted that providing venue when anonymizing technology has been used may increase the number of warrant applications, and we cannot know how many such searches there will be, or how frequently they will be used in various kinds of cases.

Judge Kethledge and another member both noted that commenters who opposed the rule offered no alternative solution to the real venue problem the government has presented. A member noted that some opponents stated candidly that they did not want to provide a forum. This may immunize people who use anonymizing technology to commit serious crimes. Given the serious nature of the criminal threats requiring investigation, it would be irresponsible for the Committee to decline to take action to fill the current gap in the venue provisions. Here, as in many other situations, judges reviewing search warrants in any venue will have the duty to apply the substantive law to new situations.

On behalf of the government, Mr. Bitkower addressed the opponents' privacy concerns. He challenged the apparent assumption of many commenters that digital privacy concerns are greater than traditional privacy concerns. To the contrary, he said, cases such as the Supreme Court's decision in *Riley v. California* (2014) have recognized that the privacy rights in technology may be *on a par with* traditional privacy rights in the physical world. In the

government's view we should apply the same rules, as much possible, to technology as to the physical world: the same probable cause rules, the same particularity rules, and as much as possible the same procedural rules. Remote searches are conducted today, and by themselves do not present new issues. What is new is the ease with which someone can conceal his location by anonymizing technology, and the amendment addresses the venue gap created by that reality. The proposed amendment is privacy enhancing, because it provides a venue in which the government can seek advance judicial authorization of a search, just as it would before conducting a search of someone's home. This process allows the courts to apply the basic principles of the Fourth Amendment to new forms of technology, as they have done, for example, with heat sensors and tracking devices. The government's goal here is to secure a warrant, a privacy enhancing process.

Although several commenters argued that the Committee should follow the precedent of Title III and wait for Congress to act, Professor Beale observed that the history of Title III cuts the other way. Title III was enacted *after* the case law on wiretaps developed, just as the case law is doing now with other forms of technology in cases such as *Riley v. California*. In general, Congress has legislated after a sufficient number of cases have been litigated to shed light on the policy issues. In the case of new technology, the courts are grappling with questions of what information is protected by the Fourth Amendment as well as how requirements such as particularity apply in new contexts. The proposed venue provision would permit the same process to operate with remote electronic searches, allowing the courts to rule on the issues of concern to the commenters. Although it is possible that providing venue will increase the number of remote searches, Professor Beale noted that it may instead increase the number of remote searches reviewed by the courts *ex ante* in the warrant application process, rather than only *ex post* following a search yielding information that the government seeks to introduce at trial.

Judge Sutton complimented the Committee on narrowing the proposed amendment and being responsive to the public concerns. He observed that approving venue for warrant applications is not the same as approving remote electronic searches. Rather, it permits more litigation as to search warrants that will shed light on the process and issues. He emphasized that the Rules Enabling Act tells the judiciary to promulgate rules of procedure, not to wait for Congress to act first. Instead, Congress responds to proposed rules.

The member who had stated opposition to the proposed amendment acknowledged that courts must deal with the issues raised by new technology but remained unable to support the amendment, characterizing it as substantive and reiterating there are many unknowns.

Discussion turned to the question what would be known or unknown in the warrant applications covered by the amendment. Mr. Bitkower noted that to obtain any warrant the government must know what crime it is investigating and what it is looking for. In the anonymizing software cases covered by the amendment, the only new unknown is the physical location of the device to be searched. Because Rule 41 currently provides no venue for a warrant application in such cases, if the government deems a situation serious but not "exigent," it must

now either wait or pursue other investigative techniques that may in some cases be more invasive. In botnet cases, he noted, the problem is the large number of computers, not the lack of information.

A member expressed the view that the most significant unknowns would arise in the botnet cases: what information might be sought from thousands or even millions of computers that had been hacked. Moreover, the technology required for different botnets may vary. He also noted that the Committee was being forward thinking in addressing these issues, since there have been relatively few botnet investigations and only one decision holding that a court cannot issue a warrant when anonymizing software has disguised the location of the device to be searched. It was sensible, he concluded, to address both problems with a narrowly tailored “surgical” amendment.

Agreeing that each criminal botnet is unique, Mr. Bitkower explained that one function of warrants under the proposed amendment could be to map a botnet before seeking to shut it down, collecting the IP addresses of the affected computers to determine the botnet’s size and where the computers are located. In previous botnet investigations, the cumbersome requirement of seeking a warrant in each district played a role in determining the government’s strategy, and civil injunctions were used. He also noted that warrant applications under the amendment would vary widely: in some cases they may be quite simple and narrow (as in the case of a single email account when the government has already obtained the password), but in other cases there will be more significant complications and new issues on which courts will have to rule.

Members compared the procedural options under the current rule and the proposed amendment in the investigation of the hacking of a major corporation or institution such as the New York Stock Exchange. If the NYSE were hacked and anonymizing software disguised the location of a device the government had probable cause to search, members speculated that the government would conduct a search under some legal theory. They identified three possible scenarios under the current rule: (1) the government might persuade a court in the Southern District of New York to grant the warrant, and then claim good faith reliance if the warrant were later invalidated for lack of venue; (2) a court in the Southern District might find probable cause but determine it had no authority to issue a warrant, in which case the government might conduct a warrantless search and argue that the failure to obtain a warrant was harmless error because the search was nevertheless supported by probable cause; or (3) the government might search without a warrant under a claim of exigent circumstances. Members expressed the view that these examples showed why it would be preferable to amend Rule 41 to provide venue for warrant applications, so that courts asked to approve such warrants would be able to focus on the constitutional issues presented by remote computer searches. Concerns about the judiciary’s understanding of the technology could be addressed by judicial education.

In response to the question how frequently the government expects to seek warrants under the proposed amendment, Mr. Bitkower noted the use of anonymizing technology by criminals is likely to become much more common. Until recently only sophisticated criminals employed

anonymizing software, but the technology is now more readily available and easier to use. In the case of botnets, in prior cases the government used non-criminal tools, but the lack of efficient venue provisions skewed the government's choices. So that authority might be employed in future cases.

Judge Raggi then called for a vote on the question whether to move forward with the proposed amendment.

By a vote of 11 to 1, the Committee voted to approve the amendment for transmission to the Standing Committee (subject to further discussion of the minor revisions proposed by the Subcommittee).

At Judge Kethledge's request, Professor Beale described the revisions proposed by the Subcommittee. The first revision was to substitute "Venue for a Warrant Application" for the current caption "Authority to Issue a Warrant." This proposal responded to the many comments that assumed the amendment would allow a remote search in any case falling within the proposed amendment (for example, any case in which an individual had used anonymizing technology such as a VPN). These commenters mistakenly viewed the amendment as providing substantive authority for such remote electronic searches, which they strongly opposed.

Beale noted that after the final Subcommittee call agreeing to amend the caption, Professor Kimble, the style consultant, first opposed making any change on the ground that no reasonable reader of Rule 41 as a whole could fail to see the many additional requirements. When advised that much of the opposition to the rule was founded on this misunderstanding, Kimble proposed an alternative caption "District from Which a Warrant May Issue." Professor King suggested that Professor Kimble may have believed this language would be clearer to lay readers than the term "venue."

Discussion focused on the need for a change in the caption, and the difference between the alternative captions. Professor Beale reminded the Committee that if there were no substantive difference, but only a question of style, it would ordinarily accept the style consultant's proposed language.

Judge Kethledge stated his strong support for amending the caption and using the Subcommittee's language. The current caption is overbroad and misleading, seeming to state an unqualified "authority" to issue warrants meeting the criteria of any of the subsections. Although Professor Kimble suggested this reading would be unreasonable, Judge Kethledge asserted that the current caption is unclear and is causing serious public opposition. By retaining the reference to "issu[ing]" warrants, Professor Kimble's language may perpetuate the misunderstanding. "Venue" is much clearer.

Members discussed the impact of different words and phrases. Several expressed support for the use of "venue," though another noted that it may not be known to non-lawyers and "venue" for the filing of a criminal case is defined differently than "venue" for the warrant applications under Rule 41(b). Judge Raggi observed that "venue" would be very clear to the

judges applying the rule. A member who agreed with the Subcommittee's recommendation also noted that other references to "authority" in the existing subsections of Rule 41(b) are also unclear; he observed that at some point it might be helpful for the Committee to revise and clarify all of the subsections.

Professor Coquillette commented that the discussion had made it clear that the Committee was grappling with a question of substance, not mere style.

The Committee voted unanimously to amend the caption of Rule 41(b) to "Venue for a Warrant Application."

Professor Beale explained that the Subcommittee also recommended two small changes in the notice provisions, Rule 41(f)(1)(C), both of which are intended to make notice of remote electronic searches parallel to the notice provided for physical searches to the extent possible.

The first change adds the requirement that the government serve a "receipt" for any property taken (as well as the warrant authorizing the search). In drafting the published notice provisions, the Committee had inadvertently omitted this requirement. Since this addition would parallel the requirements Rule 41(f)(1)(C) now imposes when the government makes a physical search and provide an additional protection for privacy, the reporters were confident it would not require republication.

The second change rephrased the obligation to provide notice to "the person whose property was searched or who possessed the information that was seized or copied." Again, the Subcommittee's intent was to parallel the requirement for physical searches. The Subcommittee rejected the suggestion in some public comments that the government should be required to provide notice to both "the person whose property was searched" and whoever "possessed the information that was seized or copied," since that is not required in the case of physical searches. For example, if the Chicago Board of Trade is served with a warrant and files containing information regarding many customers are seized, the government may give notice of the search only to the Board of Trade, and not to each of the customers whose information may be included in one or more files. The same should be true in the case of remote electronic searches. Discussion followed on how the current notice provisions applied to various hypotheticals.

The Committee voted unanimously to revise the amendment as published to require the government to serve a "receipt" as well as the warrant, and to provide notice to "the person whose property was searched or who possessed the information that was seized or copied."

Professor Beale then turned to two proposed revisions to the Committee Note. The first addition explained the new caption:

Subdivision (b). The revision to the caption is not substantive. Adding the word "venue" makes clear that Rule 41(b) identifies the courts that may consider an application for a warrant, not the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a warrant, which must also be met.

Members emphasized that the first sentence was not inconsistent with their earlier conclusion that the language of the caption presented a substantive, not merely a style issue. The

point made in the Committee Note is that the change in the caption does not alter the meaning of the existing provisions in Rule 41(b). Rather, it clarifies the effect of the amendment, making clear what the amendment does and does not do. The last sentence responds directly to the many public comments misunderstanding the effect of the amendment, stating that there are also constitutional requirements that must be met. A member suggested that the meaning would be clearer if the last sentence were revised to state that the constitutional requirements must “still” be met, and Judge Kethledge accepted this as a friendly amendment.

The Committee voted unanimously to add the following language to the Committee Note:

Subdivision (b). The revision to the caption is not substantive. Adding the word “venue” makes clear that Rule 41(b) identifies the courts that may consider an application for a warrant, not the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a warrant, which must still be met.

Finally, Professor Beale asked for approval of the Subcommittee’s proposed addition to the Committee Note regarding notice. The proposed addition explains the changes after publication, and also responds to the many comments that criticized the proposed notice provisions as insufficiently protective because they required only reasonable efforts to provide notice. The addition draws attention to the other provisions of Rule 41 that preclude delayed notice except when authorized by statute and then provides a citation to the relevant statute. Professor Coquillette commented that because of the widespread confusion on this point in the public comments, the proposed addition was an appropriate exception to the general rule that committee notes should not be used to help practitioners. Members agreed that the citation “See” is appropriate because at present the statute referenced is the only authority for delayed searches (though other provisions might at some point be added).

The Committee voted unanimously to add the underlined language to the Committee Note:

Subdivision (f)(1)(C). The amendment is intended to ensure that reasonable efforts are made to provide notice of the search, seizure, or copying, as well as a receipt for any information that was seized or copied, to the person whose property was searched or who possessed the information that was seized or copied. Rule 41(f)(3) allows delayed notice only “if the delay is authorized by statute.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a (authorizing delayed notice in limited circumstances).

B. Proposed Amendment to Rule 4

Judge Lawson, chair of the Rule 4 Subcommittee, described the public comments on the proposed amendment and the Subcommittee’s recommendation that the amendment be approved as published and transmitted to the Standing Committee. One speaker at the hearings in November 2014 supported the proposed amendment, and there were six written comments. One comment urged that the proposal be withdrawn. The others supported the amendment, though some suggested modifications in the text or committee note. The Subcommittee met by telephone to consider the comments.

Judge Lawson reminded the Committee that the proposed amendment is intended to fill a

gap in the current rules, which provide no means of service on an institutional defendant that has committed a criminal offense in the United States but has no physical presence here.

Judge Lawson explained the Subcommittee's views on various issues raised by the law firm of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan (which represents a foreign corporation that the Justice Department has been unable to serve) in support of its recommendation that the proposed amendment should be withdrawn. First, Quinn argued, by stating that any means which provides actual notice is sufficient, the rule creates a situation in which any institutional defendant that appears to contest service has in effect admitted it has been served. The Subcommittee agreed with the Justice Department's response: the point of the amendment is to provide a means of service that gives notice, and there is no legitimate interest in allowing a procedure in which an institutional defendant can feign lack of notice. If the amendment were adopted, there would be, however, objections an institutional defendant might assert by a special appearance (such as a constitutional attack on Rule 4, an objection to a retroactive application of the amendment, or a claim that an institutional defendant has been dissolved.) And, Judge Lawson said, the Subcommittee also found unpersuasive the Quinn law firm's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in *Omni Capital Int'l v. Wolff*. The Court simply required that service be made in compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Here, by amending Rule 4 to provide for service, the amendment will allow the government to make service in a manner provided for in the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Subcommittee was not persuaded by comments of the Quinn firm and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) expressing concern about the consequences of not honoring a summons, particularly a concern that this would permit trials in absentia. Judge Lawson noted that Rule 43 generally prohibits trial in absentia. Institutional defendants may appear by counsel, but their counsel must be present. NACDL suggested that the amendment or Committee Note be revised to include a reference to Rule 43. Noting the general principle that the Rules are to be read as a whole, the Subcommittee concluded it would not be wise to cross reference here to a single rule. Indeed, doing so might have negative implications when other provisions are not cross referenced. Judge Lawson also noted that trial in absentia was not among the long list of possible remedies that the Department of Justice identified in the August 2013 memorandum (included on pages 79-84 of the Agenda Book), which included criminal contempt, injunctive relief, the appointment of counsel, seizure and forfeiture of assets, as well as a variety of non-judicial sanctions (such as economic and trade sanctions, diplomatic consequences, and debarment from government contracting).

The Subcommittee also declined to adopt suggestions that the amendment be revised to provide an order of preference among the permitted methods of service. This issue, Judge Lawson noted, had been considered by the full committee, which previously determined that a requirement of this nature could generate burdensome litigation. The Subcommittee agreed.

The Subcommittee declined the Federal Magistrate Judges Association's suggestion that the committee note be revised to state that the manner of service must comply with Due Process. Judge Lawson explained the Subcommittee's view that this was unnecessary, since the Constitution must always be honored.

The Quinn law firm argued that the amendment was unwise because it would lead to reciprocal action by foreign governments against U.S. firms. Judge Lawson reminded the

Committee that it had discussed this issue at length before voting to approve the amendment for publication. As explained by the Justice Department's representatives and described in detail in the Department's August 2013 memorandum, federal prosecutors would be required to consult with the Justice Department's Office of International Affairs (which consults with the Department of State) in effecting international service.

Judge Lawson noted a final suggestion by NADCL fell outside the current proposal.

After considering all of the comments, Judge Lawson said, the Subcommittee voted unanimously to recommend that the proposed amendment be approved as published and transmitted to the Standing Committee. He then called on the Subcommittee members, Judge Rice, Mr. Siffert, and Mr. Wroblewski (representing the Department of Justice) for any additional comments.

Mr. Wroblewski thanked Judge Lawson, the Subcommittee members, and the reporters for their efforts, and he noted that the Justice Department's original proposal had been revised and improved. He commented on the reciprocity concerns, noting that federal prosecutors face reciprocity concerns every day in a variety of contexts, such as arrests and witness interviews. The United States Attorneys' Manual provides that whenever a federal prosecutor attempts to do any act outside the United States relating to a criminal investigation or prosecution or takes any other action with foreign policy implications the prosecutor is required to consult with the Office of International Affairs.

Judge Raggi observed that because that the government cannot try a defendant who has not filed a notice of appearance, the amendment might not result in a significant increase in prosecutions if non-U.S. entities don't file a notice of appearance. In such cases, however, if service has been made the government will be able to take a variety of collateral actions. The amendment is not radical. It simply provides a means of service, filling a gap in the rules.

Professor Coquillette recalled occasions when foreign governments raised objections to proposed amendments for the first time very late in the process (even at the point of Congressional consideration). He was happy to hear that the Departments of Justice and State had already consulted about this rule, and he urged the Department of Justice to do whatever it could to encourage counterparts at the State Department to bring to light now any possible objections from other nations. The Department's representatives agreed this was important, noting there had been long discussions between the Departments of State and Justice before the proposal was submitted, and throughout its consideration.

Judge Lawson added one final observation. The Quinn law firm proposed withdrawing the amendment without providing any alternative, which would mean that it would not be possible to make effective service on entities such as the Pangang Group (which the government has been unable to serve under the current rules). He noted that the Quinn law firm represents the Pangang Group, and in effect was seeking to defend it by preventing the initiation of the prosecution. This case, he said, demonstrates the necessity for the amendment. Without it, foreign entities can violate U.S. law with impunity.

Judge Sutton inquired into the breadth of the language in the proposed amendment to Rule 4(a), allowing the court to take “any action authorized by United States law” if an organization defendant fails to appear after service. Should it be limited to actions against the organizational defendant? Judge Raggi explained that not all appropriate responses would be actions against the organizational defendant itself. Notably, *in rem* sanctions might be available. And Professor Beale noted that United States law would not authorize sanctions that lacked a sufficient connection to the organizational defendant. Judge Sutton indicated he was satisfied that the broad language was appropriate.

On Judge Lawson’s motion, the Committee voted unanimously to approve the proposed amendment as published and transmit it to the Standing Committee.

C. Proposed amendment to Rule 45

Judge Lawson, chair of the CM/ECF Subcommittee, presented the Subcommittee’s recommendations regarding the previously published amendment to Rule 45 that would eliminate the three extra days provided after electronic service. The amendment reflects the view that electronic transmission and filing are now commonplace and no longer warrant additional time for action after service. It was published for comment in the fall of 2014. Similar proposals will be considered at the spring meetings of the other Rules Committees.

Judge Raggi noted that with this and other uniform rule changes being considered by all of the Rules Committees, the Criminal Rules Committee ought to consider whether criminal cases require different treatment. For example, in criminal cases there may have to be more play in the procedural joints, both as a matter of fundamental fairness when someone’s liberty is at stake, and to avoid collateral challenges when convictions are obtained.

Judge Lawson discussed the Subcommittee’s review of the comments received on the amendment to Rule 45. He first noted that the Subcommittee had rejected the Federal Magistrate Judges Association’s suggestion either to eliminate all of the parentheticals in the proposed rule or to revise the rule to refer to “(F) (other means consented to except electronic service).” The Subcommittee concluded that the parentheticals were helpful, not confusing, and that the Committee Note clearly states that no extra time is provided after electronic service.

The Subcommittee recommended one change to the Committee Note that was published for comment and two changes to the text.

Judge Lawson first addressed the Subcommittee’s recommended change to the Committee Note, which responded to concerns raised in the public comments. The Pennsylvania Bar Association and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers had opposed the proposed amendment’s elimination of the additional three days because of the difficulty it would cause practitioners and their clients. They emphasized that many criminal defense counsel are solo practitioners or in very small firms, where they have little clerical help, and do not see their ECF notices the day they are received. The Department of Justice expressed a similar concern

about situations in which service after business hours or from a location in a different time zone, or an intervening weekend or holiday, may significantly reduce the time available to prepare a response. In those circumstances, a responding party may need to seek an extension.

The Subcommittee recommended that in light of these legitimate concerns, the Committee Note to Rule 45(c) be revised to include language addressing this problem drafted by the Department of Justice:

This amendment is not intended to discourage courts from providing additional time to respond in appropriate circumstances. When, for example, electronic service is effected in a manner that will shorten the time to respond, such as service after business hours or from a location in a different time zone, or an intervening weekend or holiday, that service may significantly reduce the time available to prepare a response. In those circumstances, a responding party may need to seek an extension.

Judge Lawson noted that the Subcommittee thought added language encouraging judges to be flexible when appropriate and to expand those deadlines would allow judges to address matters on the merits. This was consistent with the position the Committee adopted for Rule 12. Liberality is especially important in the criminal context, he explained, because overly rigid application would inevitably result in Section 2255 motions and other collateral attacks. The note language keeps the text of the rule the same among committees but recognizes the particular need for flexibility in this context.

A member opposed to the amendment objected to this “compromise,” arguing that Note language is not the same as leaving the extra three days in the text of the Rule. A client may be incarcerated and cannot be reached, and if the lawyer learns about it late Friday night, but the judge says no once there is a chance to seek an extension on Monday, three or four days to respond is not enough. Another member noted that local rules may have seven day limitations even if there are no seven day limitations in the Criminal Rules.

Professor Coquillette asked the Committee to focus on why the criminal rule should be different, if the other committees are comfortable with the elimination of the three extra days after electronic service. A member explained that the client in a criminal case is often incarcerated, which restricts counsel’s access, and that responses often must be run by the client face to face in order to be accurate. Another member voiced opposition to eliminating the three days in criminal cases for two reasons. First, it is much more difficult to talk to the client before filing a response because of the distance to the location where the client is incarcerated and second, in some places local rules are interpreted liberally and some not.

Judge Raggi emphasized that there is a strong preference for uniform timing rules, so that a departure for the Criminal Rules must be justified.

After a short break, a member previously expressing opposition to the amendment to the text of the Rule withdrew that opposition based on the expectation that the note language would be included.

The Committee then unanimously approved adding to the Committee Note as published the additional language concerning extensions that had been proposed by the Department of Justice.

Professor Beale noted that the chair and reporters might need some latitude in moving forward with the new note language, given that each of the other committees will be considering this in the weeks to come and some tweaks might be necessary to achieve uniformity.

Judge Lawson then presented the Subcommittee's two recommendations to modify the text of the published amendment, each based on comments received during the publication period. The Subcommittee did not believe either change required republication.

The first recommended change was to eliminate the added phrase "Time for Motion Papers" from the caption of Rule 45, and keep the caption as it is now. Rule 12 deals extensively with the time for motions and Rule 45 does not.

The second recommendation was to modify the language of Rule 45(c) to parallel the language used in other sets of rules, referring to action "within a specified time after being served" instead of "after service." There was no reason for different phrasing in the Criminal Rule.

A motion was made to approve the text of the rule as published, with these two changes, and adopted unanimously.

D. CM/ECF Subcommittee

Judge Lawson presented the Subcommittee's recommendation regarding a mandatory electronic filing amendment being considered by the Civil Rules Committee (as well as the Appellate and Bankruptcy Committees). He explained that the proposed Civil amendment is of particular concern to the Criminal Rules Committee because Criminal Rule 49 now incorporates the Civil Rules governing service and filing. Rule 49(b) provides that "Service must be made in the manner provided for a civil action," and Rule 49(d) states "A paper must be filed in a manner provided for in a civil action." Accordingly, changes in the Civil Rules regarding service and filing will be incorporated by reference into the Criminal Rules. Also, the Criminal Rules Committee has traditionally taken responsibility for amending the Rules Governing 2254 Cases and 2255 Cases, and these rules also incorporate Civil Rules.

Judge Lawson explained that the Civil Rules Committee is considering a proposal mandating e-filing that does not exempt as a class pro se filers or inmates. Exemption is allowed either by local rule or by a showing of good cause. There are a number of districts that do not permit pro se e-filing except upon motion, and particularly discourage prisoners from e-filing because of the potential for mischief. There are also issues regarding electronic signatures. The question for the Committee is whether criminal cases warrant a different rule than that being considered by the Civil and Appellate Committees.

Professor King added that the issue is on the agenda now so that the Criminal Rules Committee's views on these issues can be conveyed to the other committees which will be considering this in the weeks to come. Also, she noted that the CM/ECF Subcommittee discussed the pro se issue and was unanimous in rejecting for criminal cases any rule that would require either a local rule or a showing of good cause in order to exempt pro se and prisoner filers. The reporters have conveyed our Subcommittee's view to those working on the rules for the other committees but so far they have not been sympathetic. Professor Beale added that the members of the working group for the Civil Committee preferred allowing districts to handle rules for pro se filers on a district-by-district basis.

The Committee's Clerk of Court Liaison, Mr. Hatten, who had been asked to share his views and experience on this issue with the Committee, presented several concerns raised by a rule that did not include an exception for pro se or inmate filers.

Mr. Hatten noted that because the CM/ECF system is a national platform that individual districts cannot modify, problems raised by extending e-filing to pro se filers will become embedded, and allowing courts to opt out will not avoid those structural problems. He noted various districts have been able to extend e-filing at their own pace, adapting to resource constraints and local challenges, and he knows of no court that extends e-filing to prisoners. Among the variations are differences in whether attorney filers may e-file sealed documents and case initiating documents.

As to pro se electronic filing, Mr. Hatten doubted the system was ready for a mandatory rule. We do not know the number of courts that presently allow this, and the extent of their experience. Many courts, perhaps even a majority, do not allow any electronic filing by pro se litigants. We really don't know how this would work because the experience with it has not been evaluated. He reviewed the history of the development of the CM/ECF system, designed for attorney use, and expressed the concern that many courts may find as a matter of policy that e-filing by pro se litigants is inappropriate or that the system is inadequate. A transition to pro se e-filing, he suggested, would not be facilitated by an opt-out rule, but instead would require further study and adequate resources, including staff resources.

Next, Mr. Hatten reviewed a number of potential problems that might arise. First, the current system anticipates a certain level of legal training and knowledge on the part of the person using the system, including knowledge of the rules as to what to file, when, and in what format. Non-lawyer, untrained filers may incorrectly characterize or describe their filings, tasks that are already a challenge for some lawyers. Pro se filers may file the same thing multiple times, fail to attach required documents, or attach the wrong document. This difficulty would be enhanced if the person is not a recurring user. Judges must use these designations, which may not be clear. Lawyers who must respond to the filing also may experience additional burdens. Court staff review docket entries for accuracy, and if there is an error, the staff must make a separate entry to rename the docket entry; they do not change the original filing. Increased errors would require increased staff resources for review and correction of docket entries. His court has had experience with pro se filers inferring some nefarious motive on the part of court staff when a docket entry is changed. This is in addition to the increased resources needed to train pro se filers.

Judge Raggi asked whether electronic filing or paper filing is a more efficient use of clerk's office staff. Mr. Hatten responded that for attorney filers there is a great advantage in electronic filing, but there will not be the same advantages for pro se filers. Pro se filers will be calling staff with normal questions you would expect from someone with less experience about how to file and other aspects of the system. And the quality control will be a very significant burden because pro se litigants will not understand the significance of what they are filing.

Mr. Hatten continued that in contrast to paper documents which can be screened before entry in the system, there is no ability to pre-screen materials before they are e-filed to identify any pornographic, confidential, libelous, or otherwise offensive or objectionable materials. E-filing results in immediate access via the internet to whatever is filed, through PACER or through subscription services such as Lexis or RSS feeds. There is no filter on the PACER system, which anyone can use. There are services that provide to a subscriber instantaneous access to anything filed in a particular case. Once captured and broadcast by these services, documents cannot be re-captured. This could lead to the release of personal data or materials that should not have been filed. Because electronic filings made late Friday are not reviewed by staff until Monday, there is a period of time when the unreviewed information would be available to anyone. Issues created by a pro se filer's use of the system could be addressed by a court after the fact, but any harm through unretrievable dissemination of offensive, confidential, or sealed materials would already have taken place. If the filing was in paper and screened first, the staff would review the document, then scan it, give it an appropriate name, and docket it.

Additionally, Mr. Hatten raised the potential of the "loss of docket integrity" if login and password information is made available to non-lawyers. Once issued a password in CM/ECF, any individual using that login information may access and file in any case in the system, regardless whether that person is a party to the case or whether the case is open or closed. For example they can file in any defendant's case. That login and password could be used by anyone who obtains it. There are no means to verify the identity of the actual individual accessing the system, if someone were to suggest that the login information was used without authorization. Potentially, with login information, someone unconstrained by the rules governing attorneys could maliciously interfere in unrelated cases. Expanded access by non-attorneys could even lead to denial of service attacks on the system, he noted, emphasizing that this was speculation. He did not know if expanding access would raise the risk of the introduction of malware or other viruses into the system, which until now has been very reliable. He noted that courts can block use of a password, but it would be "shutting the door after the cow's left the barn." Any information, such as information about a victim, or sealed materials that someone had filed electronically after obtaining them in paper form, would have already been released.

Judge Raggi asked if this ability to file in any case has been the subject of previous discussion. Mr. Hatten noted that it hadn't been a problem as far as he knew, because all filers were attorneys. Judge Lawson noted that this was one of the main reasons his district restricted CM/ECF access to attorneys.

Mr. Hatten continued that electronic notice of filing requires an individual email account, and it is not known whether pro se filers filing from an institution will be able to receive such notices, because of capacity limits or spam filters. Even in instances with a good lawyer email address, those email accounts are sometimes so full the court gets a bounce back. Sources a pro se party may use for filing, such as a public library, may be unavailable to receive email. The CM/ECF system requires the ability to contact a filer regarding missing information such as address or phone number. If delivery is not available, a paper notice would be required, which would reduce any advantage from e-filing.

Electronic filing, Mr. Hatten observed, may also require that the filer qualify for electronic payment. Those who lack credit cards, such as inmates, may not be able to file case-initiating documents.

Another concern, Mr. Hatten stated, was that the round-the-clock availability of the e-filing system. Past experience with some pro se paper filings suggests that extending e-filing to pro se litigants would significantly increase the volume of prisoner and pro se filings. Courts have experience measuring the filings of vexatious litigants in pounds not pages. Many examples are readily available. He mentioned two in his district: one, using paper filings only, filed 964 appeals in eleven regional circuits and the Federal Circuit and 2637 civil actions nationwide; another, using paper filings only, filed 76 appeals in four circuits, and 33 civil actions in 17 districts.

Perhaps extending e-filing to pro se filers could overcome some of these issues if the system could be modified to allow pro se filings to drop into a box so that court staff could review them before anybody else would see them. That might be better, but it is not possible in the existing system. Moreover, there are no resources available to court staff to implement a program of this potential magnitude, he said.

Mr. Hatten also raised the concern that if the rule changed to require e-filing unless there was a local rule or a showing of good cause, courts may expect demands by pro se and prisoner filers that they are entitled to access CM/ECF. Finally he raised a concern about the language of the proposed change to the Civil Rule referring to the electronic signature.

Judge Raggi asked the Department of Justice to share its views about extending e-filing to pro se and prisoner filers. Mr. Wroblewski stated that it seems clear the CM/ECF system is just not ready to handle all of the types of cases the Department sees, especially the Section 2255 cases. For example, the courts are in the middle of a retroactive guideline change, and in many districts the prisoners have no attorneys, but all are required to file, and although many have access to email, none have access to the internet. And there are tens of thousands of prisoners who are being held by the Marshal's Service, mostly in county jails, not federal facilities, with no computer access. We are just not ready for this, he stated, and are very concerned that we need to provide access to the courts for all of the pro se litigants, including those incarcerated.

On the electronic signature issue, he noted, there had been concern that it might cause problems with prosecuting bankruptcy fraud, but the Department doesn't see a huge problem with the criminal filings, at this point. But they are not ready to jump to a mandatory system.

In response to a question whether the Department thought the proposed rule provides enough flexibility, Mr. Wroblewski stated they will defer to the courts, but just want to make sure that all criminal litigants, including Section 2254 filers, have a way to access to the courts. If courts want to opt out of a new rule, and guarantee access that way, that is fine, but the courts must be open to these litigants.

Judge Raggi noted that the electronic filing proposal is being advanced with great vigor by the other Committees, but no one has indicated what the fallback plan would be should the system fail, either from an attack on the system itself or some other disaster. There is a real need for courts to operate in times of emergency, such as 9-11 or Hurricane Sandy, but there seems to be no fallback plan should the computers fail. District judges no longer maintain their own dockets, but are subject to the dictates of nationwide technology. She urged that in working with other committees, we should keep in mind that the Criminal Rules' unique concern with liberty. She also observed that requiring e-filing may put more distance between those who use the courts and the courts, and that the added resources needed to allow this to work aggravates these concerns. But the fundamental point is that these are criminal litigants in proceedings about liberty. She encouraged members to think about what is the advantage to them or us of having those papers filed electronically as opposed to hard copy.

In response to her request for input from members about whether this could be handled at the local level, one member related that in his district 10% of pro se filings are being filed electronically. As to pro se filers, this member reported, they have not had any problems. If a pro se filer does not want to file in CM/ECF, it is simple to opt out, and 90% of pro se's do opt out and file with paper. They file a form requesting they not have to file electronically and the magistrate routinely grants it. The good cause is usually "I don't have access to the Internet."

His district also has two state prisons, the member continued, and the state department of corrections has a very new limited pilot program allowing prisoners to file electronically in Section 1983 cases, not habeas actions. This is a good thing, he reported, because it has cut down the many, many pages of hard to decipher handwriting. Prisoners use a computer station to file these documents, so they come in typed in a standard format. Prisoners have time allotted to go to that location and file that document. He noted that there were so many prisoner filings, more than half of the docket, and the program was driven by that volume. He reiterated that the program is in "an infant stage," and that it could go sideways.

Another member noted that her district allows pro se filing in civil cases but requires training first, and she thought that a few districts were working on pilot projects allowing persons in custody to make filings. But this member could not imagine how this could possibly be required in habeas cases because state facilities don't give access.

Another member noted that if there is a top-down rule that says e-filing is required but you can opt out, at least 92 districts will opt out. Those who are detained but not yet convicted are in county jails in his district, with no computers. The state doesn't even have electronic filing for lawyers, and his district doesn't allow pro se e-filing, for some of the reasons stated before. There are ways to work toward this gradually, but having a top-down rule that everyone opts out of is not

good process, and reflects badly on the credibility of the rules process.

Professor Coquillette noted that local rules have been a matter of concern for Congress for decades, because they don't have the oversight provided by the Rules Enabling Act. Sometimes, however, there is a national rule that says go out and make local rules. This occurs in two situations: where there are real differences district to district, and where the subject matter is so premature it requires experimentation. Both of those conditions may apply here.

Another member noted that in 90% of situations the mandatory e-filing rule is ill advised and out of touch for people in county jails. His state has a tremendous budget crisis, won't fund providing prisoners with facilities to file electronically, and prisoners would file suits alleging denial of access to the courts. It is a top-down rule to fix a problem that doesn't exist. Already there are functioning local rules, and no need for this massive energy to change a system that seems to be working. This member was not aware of any reason that providing internet access to prisoners would be a priority, or that prisoner filings should be lock step with filings in civil cases.

Professor Beale suggested that we could amend Rule 49 in various ways to accommodate a different rule for criminal cases if the Civil Rules Committee proceeds with the existing draft. However, the Civil Rules Committee might put their proposed rule on hold, and study it more, or decide it is ready to publish something now, but agree to slow down later.

Professor Coquillette stated that the Standing Committee would want to hear what the Criminal Rules Committee thinks is best for criminal cases.

Judge Raggi asked the Subcommittee to meet again before the Standing Committee meets to consider what sections might be amended to deal with these concerns as to Rule 49 and also the 2254 and 2255 Rules to the extent we are responsible for them.

A member added that our goal would be to have our own amendment to Rule 49 take effect before 92 districts had to opt out of a mandate.

Judge Lawson expressed appreciation for Mr. Hatten's contribution. He noted the Subcommittee was comfortable with requiring e-filing for lawyers, and had not addressed prisoner filings in 1983 cases. The Subcommittee opposed a Civil Rules amendment that provided no carve out for pro se or prisoner filers. He agreed with the many concerns discussed, and noted that not all of those who file in criminal cases are parties. Witnesses, law enforcement, and third party owners would not necessarily have CM/ECF access. Most importantly, he argued, the rule implicates constitutional rights that do not arise in civil cases, and requiring pro se prisoner filers to demonstrate good cause before they can access the courts would probably raise constitutional issues. He asked the Committee to convey its preference for an approach that carves out pro se filers from any mandatory rule.

A member noted that he is in favor of that motion, that in his district this is not done, and that a top-down rule is a bad idea if clerks and local committees in almost every district wonder how out of touch this is. On the ground, pro se litigants are not filing through CM/ECF.

Judge Raggi agreed we can make these suggestions to the Civil Rules Committee, and she favored doing so, noting that a litigant who wants to go into every case in a judge's docket could cause a fair amount of trouble. But she also urged that the Criminal Rules Committee should also have an alternative plan in reserve.

A member said our alternative should be to work on delinking our rule from the Civil Rules. Another member noted the Committee may have to recommend amendments to 49(b) and (d), and a third noted that 49(e) may need work as well.

There was discussion about whether the Committee favored retaining current Rule 49(e), to preserve status quo. Judge Lawson thought there may need to be different treatment for those who are incarcerated and those who are not, and said that his initial proposal was not to preserve status quo.

A member stated he was unprepared to vote on specifics. He did not favor going beyond conveying the Committee's concerns to the other Committee at this point. He specifically did not agree with any rule stating pro se or prisoners may have CM/ECF access.

Judge Lawson agreed with Judge Raggi's suggestion that the committee vote on whether to inform the other committees that the Criminal Rules Committee has reservations about requiring mandatory electronic filing for pro se litigants and pro se criminal litigants, because we predict that almost every district would create an exception.

A member agreed that if a Rules Committee gets out in front of what is happening on the ground in 92 of 94 districts, that's a problem. Now Rule 49 allows local rulemaking, and all districts have local rules that are working well. It doesn't make sense to require the local rules committees in all of these districts to reconvene and do something else.

The resolution of the sense of the Committee was adopted unanimously.

Judge Raggi stated that she would voice these concerns,³ and our Subcommittee will continue to look at our own rule.

E. Proposed Amendment to Rule 35 (15-CR-A)

In a law review article submitted to the Committee in February, Professor Kevin Bennardo urged that Rule 35 be amended to bar appeal waivers before sentencing. Judge Dever, the chair of the subcommittee that reviewed another recent proposal to amend Rule 35, was asked to comment

³ Following the meeting, the reporters and chair conveyed these concerns. The chairs, reporters, and members working on the proposed Civil Rule and parallel changes in the Bankruptcy and Appellate Rules were very responsive to the Advisory Committee's concerns, and a revised version of the proposed Civil Rule excluding persons not represented by counsel was presented to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. Representatives of all committees will continue to collaborate as the rules on electronic service, filing, and signature move forward.

on Professor Bennardo's proposal.

Judge Dever concluded that the proposal is trying to solve a nonexistent problem by creating a second Rule 11 process that will not save the appellate courts any time. He recommended that the proposal not be referred to a subcommittee and that it not be pursued further. He noted several problems with the assumptions underlying the proposal. First, the circuits uniformly accept waivers of appeal in plea agreements, rejecting one of the article's central premises, namely that there cannot be a knowing waiver of appeal until the sentence is imposed. Second, the article erroneously assumes that judges do not consider the Section 3553(a) factors if there is an appellate waiver. Finally, the proposal is intended to save the appellate courts time, because it assumes that the appeal would be stayed while the government negotiates an appeal waiver after sentencing, after which there would be a new process in the trial court by which the defendant will receive a lower sentence. The article also asserted that this will lead to fewer defendants who breach the appeal waiver by asking their lawyer to file the notice of appeal.

Judge Raggi asked for members to comment. Hearing no comment, she called for a vote on the recommendation not to pursue this further.

The motion not to pursue the proposal passed unanimously.

F. Proposed Amendment to Rule 35 (14-CR-E)

The New York Council of Defense Lawyers submitted a proposal to amend Rule 35 to permit a judge to reduce a sentence of a defendant who has served two thirds of his incarceration and establishes one of the following circumstances by clear and convincing evidence: (1) newly discovered scientific evidence that raises a substantial question about the validity of his conviction; (2) substantial rehabilitation during confinement; or (3) deterioration of condition (providing an alternative to compassionate relief). Following brief discussion at the November 2014 meeting, Judge Raggi appointed a subcommittee, chaired by Judge Dever, to consider the proposal.

Judge Dever presented the report of the Subcommittee, which concluded that the proposed amendment to Rule 35 involved changes beyond the Committee's purview and recommended that the Committee take no further action on the proposal.

The motion not to pursue the proposal passed unanimously.

G. Other Business

Judge Raggi stated that if the Rule 41 changes are adopted, that would be a good time to help the Federal Judicial Center work on a primer on how electronic searches work. She stated that Judge Kethledge, Chair of the Rule 41 Subcommittee, Professor Kerr, the Department of Justice, Mr. Siffert and she would work with the FJC on this project.

Finally, Judge Raggi noted the next meeting of the Committee will be September 28-29 in Seattle, Washington.

The meeting was adjourned.