PUBLIC HEARING ON
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON CRIMINAL RULES

Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building
Washington, D.C.
November 5, 2014
List of Confirmed Witnesses for the
Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules

Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building
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November 5, 2014 – 9:00 A.M.

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MEMORANDUM

To: Members of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
From: American Civil Liberties Union
Date: October 31, 2014
Re: Second ACLU Comment on the Proposed Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning “Remote Access” Searches of Electronic Storage Media

Dear Members of the Committee,

The American Civil Liberties Union submits these comments to aid the Committee’s consideration of the proposed amendment to Rule 41 concerning “remote access” searches of computers and other electronic devices. The amendment was proposed by the Department of Justice last year, and modified by the Committee at its April 2014 meeting.1

We appreciate the careful scrutiny that the Committee has given to the proposed amendment so far and, in particular, the changes made during the Committee’s April 2014 meeting. By narrowing the proposed circumstances in which warrants for remote access searches may be sought, the Committee addressed many of the problems identified by the ACLU in the original proposal.

Nonetheless, we continue to have serious concerns about the breadth of the proposed amendment, and we urge the Committee to reject the proposal in full.

This comment raises questions about the first prong of the proposal, which would permit law enforcement agencies to remotely install surveillance software on a target’s computer if “the district where the media or information is located has been concealed through technological means.”2 Although the second prong of the proposal, which the government has argued is necessary for botnet investigations,3 also raises serious questions, the ACLU leaves it to others to flesh out those questions.4

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3 See Advisory Committee Materials at 172.
4 Given the technical complexity associated with the botnets, we recommend that the committee solicit input from botnet experts from both academia and industry.
This comment begins by describing the technological means by which law enforcement agencies will likely carry out the “remote access searches” that would be authorized by the proposed amendment, and the computer security and policy concerns raised by such operations. It then explains that the proposal does not merely regulate procedure, but in fact affects substantive rights and substantively expands the government’s investigatory power. Finally, it argues that the substantive authority sought by the government through its proposal raises serious constitutional questions. On the basis of these serious policy and constitutional questions, the ACLU recommends that the Committee reject the proposal as going beyond the scope of the Rules’ limited purpose and defer to Congress to address this issue in the first instance.

We very much appreciate the Committee’s consideration of this comment and look forward to discussing our concerns with the Committee during the upcoming public meeting.

I. The Means Available to the Government to Conduct “Remote Access” Searches

The proposed amendment to Rule 41 would allow a magistrate judge to issue a warrant authorizing law enforcement “to use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored information.” Neither the proposed amendment nor the proposed committee note define “remote access.” Submissions from the Department of Justice to the Subcommittee on Rule 41 provide some description of what is meant by “remote access” and how such searches might be carried out, but crucial details remain missing. In order for the Committee to make an informed assessment of the implications of the proposed amendment, we begin this comment with a detailed explanation of what the government means by “remote access” search, how such surveillance is carried out, and why authorizing use of these techniques raises serious technological and policy concerns.

A. Federal law enforcement agencies have used malware for nearly fifteen years.

Since at least 2001, federal law enforcement agencies have used sophisticated surveillance software as part of criminal and national security investigations. This software, whether delivered through trickery, by hacking into the computers of targets, or through other covert techniques, permits agents to track and locate the computers and mobile devices of targets, as well as access private information stored on them.

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5 Proposed Amendments Materials at 338.
6 See generally Advisory Committee Materials at 179–235.
8 The Department of Justice has stressed that it is merely engaging in remote computer searches, not “hacking.” See Advisory Committee Materials at 245. However, internal FBI emails use the terms “penetration” and “exploit” when describing the CIPAV software, which, like hacking, are both terms of art from the computer security community. See Email from [redacted] (OTD) (FBI) to [redacted] (OTD) (FBI) et al. (June 20, 2007), available at https://www.eff.org/document/fbicipav-08pdf, p. 50; Email from [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) to [redacted] (SL) (FBI) (Nov. 20, 2008), available at https://www.eff.org/document/fbicipav-08pdf at p. 154. Using the term “hacking” is descriptively accurate.
In 2001, journalists revealed that the FBI had developed a software suite capable of covertly accessing information stored on suspects’ computers. In the initial media reports revealing the existence of the FBI’s Magic Lantern tool, a spokesperson for the FBI described it as a “workbench project” that had not yet been deployed. One year later, in a then-classified memo, a DOJ prosecutor wrote that the tool, later renamed the Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier (CIPAV), had already entered regular use, and was “being used needlessly by some agencies.”

Although the existence of this tool was first revealed by the press in 2001, it was not until 2007 that journalists discovered a case in which it had been used. Indeed, although the FBI has employed similar surveillance software for nearly fifteen years, only a handful of cases have come to the public’s attention. This is, we believe, due to a concerted policy by the FBI of keeping everything about its use of this technology out of the public eye. For now, the only law enforcement agency known to use malware is the FBI. However, it is likely that other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies have also acquired hacking software.

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9 FBI Sheds Light on 'Magic Lantern' PC Virus, Reuters, supra.
12 See Email from [redacted], Unit Chief, FBI Cryptologic and Electronic Analysis Unit to [redacted] (SE) (FBI) (July 18, 2007), available at https://www.eff.org/document/fbicipav-08pdf at p.10 (“We try to make every effort possible to protect the FBI’s sensitive tools and techniques...we want to ensure that the capabilities of the CIPAV are minimized [in future media reports], if discussed at all. This and many tools deployed by the FBI are law enforcement sensitive and, as such, we request that as little information as possible be provided to as few individuals as possible.”); see also Email from [redacted] (OTD) to [redacted] (OTD) (CON) et al. (Aug. 15, 2004), available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/cipav/fbi_cipav-07.pdf at p.11 (“We never discuss how we collect the [information about a target computer obtained by the CIPAV software] in the warrants/affidavits or with case agents, AUSAs, squad supervisors, outside agencies, etc.”).
13 “Malware” and “spyware” are terms of art in the computer security community that describe software used to covertly gain access to and extract information from the computers of targets. See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F. 3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing “malicious software, known as 'malware,’ that can compromise the security and functionality of a computer”); see also Morgan Marquis-Boire et al., Police Story: Hacking Team’s Government Surveillance Malware, Citizen Lab (July 24, 2014), https://citizenlab.org/2014/06/backdoor-hacking-teams-tradecraft-android-implant/ (describing the capabilities of a malware tool sold by a commercial surveillance company to law enforcement and intelligence agency customers around the world); Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Hearing on Global Security Threats and Intelligence Operations Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf (“A handful of commercial companies sell computer intrusion kits on the open market. These hardware and software packages can give governments and cybercriminals the capability to steal, manipulate, or delete information on targeted systems. Even more companies develop and sell professional-quality technologies to support cyber operations—often branding these tools as lawful-intercept or defensive security research products.”).
14 See Cora Currier & Morgan Marquis-Boire, Secret Manuals Show the Spyware Sold to Despots and Cops Worldwide, Intercept (Oct. 30, 2014), https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/10/30/hacking-team/ (“Hacking Team’s efforts include a visible push into the U.S. . . . The company has made at least some sales to American entities . . . .”); Kade Crockford, Spy Tech Secretly Embeds Itself in Phones, Monitors and Operates Them from Afar, PrivacySOS (Aug. 18, 2012), https://www.privacysos.org/node/789 (describing the capabilities of mobile malware sold by a Virginia-based company, Oceans’ Edge, which has apparently sold its software to both the FBI and DEA).
B. Capabilities of the FBI’s surveillance software

Like much of the commercially available ‘lawful interception’ malware sold by surveillance companies to governments around the world, it appears that the FBI’s malware tools have a number of capabilities that can be customized for the particular operation, depending on what features are needed, and what the magistrate judge has approved.

In one of the more basic modes of operation, for example, the software can collect the IP address of the targeted computer. This is particularly useful when the target is using an anonymizing proxy, which hides his or her IP address. With an IP address, agents can subpoena subscriber information from the Internet Service Provider responsible for that IP address, and then search the home or business where the targeted computer is believed to be located.

In another mode of operation, the software can collect a long list of information about a target computer, including, but not limited to: IP address; MAC address (identifying the WiFi or Ethernet card); a list of running programs; the operating system type, version and serial number; the default internet browser and version; the registered user of the operating system, and registered company name, if any; the current logged-in user name; and the address of the last website visited in the user’s web browser.

If a more thorough search of the computer is required, the FBI has software capable of searching a target’s computer to obtain “records of Internet activity, including firewall logs, caches, browser history and cookies, ‘bookmarked’ or ‘favorite’ Web pages, search terms that the user entered into any Internet search engine, and records of user-typed Web addresses,” as well as “saved user names and passwords, documents, browsing history, user profiles, e-mail contents, e-mail contacts, chat messaging logs, photographs, and correspondence.”

In addition to the ability to access essentially any data already stored on the target’s computer, the FBI also has the ability to remotely access and enable the GPS chip, microphone, or webcam in a target’s computer or mobile device. As such, the FBI has the capability to

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16 Poulsen, FBI’s Secret Spyware Tracks Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats, supra.


18 See id. at 3; see also Jennifer Valentino-DeVries & Danny Yadron, FBI Taps Hacker Tactics to Spy on Suspects, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873239970045786419993388259674 (“[T]he bureau can remotely activate the microphones in phones running Google Inc.’s Android software to record conversations, one former U.S. official said. It can do the same to microphones in laptops without the user knowing, the person said.”); see also Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, FBI’s Search for ‘Mo,’ Suspect in Bomb Threats, Highlights Use of Malware for Surveillance, Wash. Post, Dec. 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2013/12/06/352ba174-5397-11e3-9e2c-e1d01116fd98_story.html (“The FBI has been able to covertly activate a computer’s camera — without triggering
generate location information, to capture audio through the microphone, and to capture photographs or videos using the target’s webcam. According to an ex-senior FBI official, the FBI even has the capability to disable a webcam’s indicator light, so that there will be no way of knowing that the camera is recording.19

C. Methods for infecting the computers of targets with malware

There are several ways in which agents can deliver malicious software to the computer or mobile device of a target. We introduce several of the most popular methods here. This is by no means an exhaustive list, as law enforcement and intelligence agencies can be extremely creative in their efforts to surveil targets and covertly bug computers and mobile devices.

i. Social engineering

In a social engineering operation, agents will send an email or other communication to a target, with the goal of convincing the target to take a particular action, such as clicking on a link in the message, or opening an attachment.20 Such operations almost always involve some degree of deception, as targets are unlikely to perform the desired action if it is clear from the sender information (i.e., the “From” line of an email) that it is from a law enforcement agency. As a result, agents engaging in such operations are likely to impersonate third parties, such as the target’s associates,21 or organizations known to the target. For example, in 2007, FBI agents successfully delivered CIPAV surveillance software by sending a link to a fake Associated Press article, created by agents for that investigation, to the target of the operation.22 Presumably, as soon as the target clicked on the link to the article, the CIPAV was delivered to his computer. The FBI likely exploited a security vulnerability in his web browser to deliver the CIPAV software.

The success of this operation depends on being able to trick the target into taking the desired action. For sophisticated targets, particularly those with expertise in computer security, this may be difficult.

19 See Timberg & Nakashima, FBI’s Search for ‘Mo,’ Suspect, supra.
20 See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries & Danny Yadron, supra (“Officers often install surveillance tools on computers remotely, using a document or link that loads software when the person clicks or views it.”).
ii. Surreptitious entry

The FBI has a long, controversial history of secretly breaking into the homes or offices of targets and installing covert recording devices.\(^\text{23}\) Surreptitious entry operations, commonly known as *black bag jobs*, are also used to install surveillance software and hardware on the computers of targets.\(^\text{24}\) The earliest publicly known example of a black bag job was in 1999.\(^\text{25}\) These operations of course require that agents know the physical location of the target.

iii. Watering hole attacks

Agents wishing to install surveillance software onto the computers of many individuals who all share a common interest or association may decide to perform a so called *watering hole attack*. In such operations, agents will install custom code on a website popular with the target group, which will infect the computers of everyone who visits the site. This technique has been repeatedly used by the FBI,\(^\text{26}\) as well as by foreign state actors.\(^\text{27}\) When this technique is used, agents may not know the identity of a particular target or targets, and may in fact not know ahead of time the identities of *any* of the targets whose computers will be eventually be compromised.

iv. Third-party service provider-aided delivery of surveillance software

By enlisting the assistance of third-party service providers, such as telecommunications and internet service providers, agents can leverage the trusted access that such providers have to a target’s communications and, in some cases, their computers or mobile devices.

In a *man in the middle* attack, surveillance software can be delivered, typically with special-purpose surveillance hardware installed in an internet provider’s data center (and thus, with the assistance of that company), by intercepting requests from a target’s computer to access internet content, impersonating the server the target is attempting to connect to, and then sending


\(^{24}\) See Valentino-DeVries & Yadron, supra (“In some cases, the government has secretly gained physical access to suspects’ machines and installed malicious software using a thumb drive, a former U.S. official said.”).

\(^{25}\) See United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 577 (D.N.J. 2001) (“Because the encrypted file could not be accessed via traditional investigative means, [the judge’s] Order permitted law enforcement officers to ‘install and leave behind software, firmware, and/or hardware equipment which will monitor the inputted data entered on [defendant’s] computer in the TARGET LOCATION so that the F.B.I. can capture the password necessary to decrypt computer files by recording the key related information as they are entered.’”).


malicious software back to the target instead. This technique exploits the fact that much of the content accessed on the web is unencrypted, and thus vulnerable to tampering by third parties. There are several companies that sell products designed to deliver surveillance software in this manner, at least one of which has sold its products to the FBI.

Another example of third-party-company–aided delivery involves forcing a service provider to push surveillance software disguised as a security update to customers. This technique has been used by at least one foreign government, using software made by a California-based surveillance company.

D. The surveillance software infection process

The process of delivering surveillance software to a target’s computer or mobile device generally consists of a number of different steps. In order to understand the important public policy and legal issues associated with the use of this surveillance technique, it is necessary to first understand the way in which this software is delivered to targets.

Step 1: Reconnaissance

In this step, agents determine a selector that can identify each target. For individual targets, this might be an email address, username, telephone number or IP address. For watering hole attacks, the agents will identify the website or server that will be used. If agents plan to infect the target device in-person, through a black bag job, then they must locate the home, office or hotel room where the target’s computer or mobile device will be.

Step 2: Attack setup

In this step, agents create the phishing email, prepare the code that will be added to the webpage that the user will visit, or customize the surveillance software that will subsequently be delivered and run on the target’s device.

Step 3: Delivery / Acquisition

28 See Barton Gellman, U.S. Firm Helped the Spyware Industry Build a Potent Digital Weapon for Sale Overseas, Wash. Post, Aug. 15, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/spyware-tools-allow-buyers-to-slip-malicious-code-into-youtube-videos-microsoft-pages/2014/08/15/31c5696c-249c-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html (“Merely by playing a YouTube video or visiting a Microsoft Live service page, for instance, an unknown number of computers around the world have been implanted with Trojan horses by government security services that siphon their communications and files . . . . Network injection allows products built by Gamma and Hacking Team to insert themselves into an Internet data flow and change it undetectably in transit.”).


In this step, agents deliver the government’s surveillance software to the target’s computer. If agents use social engineering, agents will send the previously prepared phishing message to an address known to be used by the target. In a watering hole attack, agents will insert the previously prepared code into the webpage on the site that targets will visit. If agents are engaged in a black bag job, in this step, agents will gain covert access to the house, office or hotel of the target, and locate the computer or mobile device.

**Step 4: Exploitation**

In this step, the exploit shellcode, a special piece of malicious software, is executed on the target’s computer, bypassing or circumventing any security software or other built-in protections present in the targeted software application.32 If agents use a social engineering attack, the shellcode might be executed because the target clicks on a link in the phishing email. If a watering hole attack is used, the exploitation will take place merely when the target visits the webpage that has been modified by the agents. If the agents have conducted a black bag job, the agents will install the software themselves, likely using removable media such as a USB thumb drive.

In many cases, particularly in so-called drive by download attacks,33 where the target’s computer is infected merely by clicking on a link or visiting a particular website, the exploitation step will typically involve the exploitation of one or more security vulnerabilities in the web browser, word processor or operating system of the target’s device, *infra* Part I.C. The use of exploits enables the surveillance software to be covertly installed on the target’s computer.

**Step 4a: Validation (optional)**

In some operations, particularly when agents may not be confident that the device they have exploited is the correct target, an optional validation step may take place, in which specific information is extracted from the infected computer in order to identify the device and its owner. Examples of such information might include, for example, the computer’s IP address, the MAC address identifying the WiFi interface, and other permanent device identification numbers.

**Step 5: Installation**

In this step, the full surveillance software suite, or *payload*, will be downloaded and installed on the computer of the target.

**Step 6: Exfiltration**

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32 Amit Klein, *Multi-Stage Exploit Attacks for More Effective Malware Delivery*, Trusteer Blog (May 2, 2013), http://www.trusteer.com/blog/multi-stage-exploit-attacks-for-more-effective-malware-delivery (“Most drive-by exploit kits use a minimal exploit shellcode that downloads and runs the final payload. This is akin to a two-stage ICBM (InterContinental Ballistic Missile) where the first stage, the exploit, puts the rocket in its trajectory and the second stage, the payload, inflicts the damage. In the cybercrime world, the de-coupling of the first stage from the payload is designed to make sure that an exploit kit is as generic as possible and can deliver all possible payloads.”).

In this step, the surveillance software collects the desired information on the target and then transmits that information back to a server controlled by the government. This may involve searching documents or other files on the computer, as well as activating the webcam or microphone in the device. In some operations, the surveillance software may collect the information sought, transmit it back to the government, and then erase itself from the target’s computer. In other cases, where long-term surveillance is desired, the software may remain on the target’s computer, collecting data, and regularly transmitting that data back to the government.

II. Technological and Policy Concerns

There are a number of serious technical and policy concerns related to the covert installation and use of surveillance software by law enforcement agencies.

A. Security flaws in surveillance software can weaken the security of the target’s device and expose it to compromise by other unauthorized parties

In 2011, security researchers in Germany obtained a copy of surveillance software that the German authorities had, for two years, used to remotely monitor targets in criminal investigations. The researchers analyzed the software, and discovered that the developers of the software had made elementary programming mistakes, the most serious of which exposed devices running the surveillance software to remote control by other, unauthorized parties. This is not the only example of security vulnerabilities being discovered in surveillance software. Indeed, significant security flaws have repeatedly been discovered in several widely used interception and surveillance software products.

That security vulnerabilities exist in surveillance software is not surprising. All software programs have bugs, some of which may eventually be exploited by hackers. But as one leading scholar has noted, security flaws in surveillance systems can be particularly problematic, as their exploitation can lead to a catastrophic loss of communications confidentiality. The risk of these

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34 See Admin, Chaos Computer Club Analyzes Government Malware, Chaos Computer Club (Oct. 8, 2011), http://ccc.de/en/updates/2011/staatstrojaner (“The analysis also revealed serious security holes that the trojan is tearing into infected systems. The screenshots and audio files it sends out are encrypted in an incompetent way, the commands from the control software to the trojan are even completely unencrypted. Neither the commands to the trojan nor its replies are authenticated or have their integrity protected. Not only can unauthorized third parties assume control of the infected system, but even attackers of mediocre skill level can connect to the authorities, claim to be a specific instance of the trojan, and upload fake data. It is even conceivable that the law enforcement agencies' IT infrastructure could be attacked through this channel. The CCC has not yet performed a penetration test on the server side of the trojan infrastructure.”).
35 Id.
flaws being exploited is not theoretical. Sophisticated state actors have hacked into communications surveillance systems and databases on multiple known occasions, in some cases using security flaws in the surveillance software itself.

B. The US government, and the FBI in particular, do not have a strong track record of technical excellence.

If the US government had a strong track record of creating and deploying secure software, perhaps the risks associated with security flaws in government surveillance software could be ignored. Unfortunately, the government’s track record is less than solid. The government’s information technology (IT) procurement process is widely acknowledged to be broken, leading to the government paying far too much money for poorly written, often flawed software. Examples of botched IT procurement can be found in practically every agency. High-profile instances include Healthcare.gov and the FBI’s Sentinel case management system.

Federal government agencies have a particularly poor track record when it comes to data security. Agencies struggle with the most basic security practices, such as using good passwords, updating anti-virus software, and encrypting internet traffic on their websites. The results are predictable: data breaches by federal agencies are now routine—there were a staggering 25,000

38 See, e.g., Vassilis Prevelakis & Diomidis Spinellis, The Athens Affair, IEEE Spectrum (June 29, 2007), http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair (describing how “hackers broke into a [Greek] telephone network and subverted its built-in wiretapping features for their own purposes . . . . While the hack was complex, the taps themselves were straightforward. When the [Greek] prime minister, for example, initiated or received a call on his cellphone, the exchange would establish the same kind of connection used in a lawful wiretap—a connection to a shadow number allowing it to listen in on the conversation.”); see also Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Hackers Who Breached Google Gained Access to Sensitive Data, U.S. Officials Say, Wash. Post, May 20, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-hackers-who-breached-google-gained-access-to-sensitive-data-us-officials-say/2013/05/20/51330428-be34-11e2-89e9-3be8095fe767_story.html.
39 See Nat’l Sec. Agency, DOCID No. 352694, Phone Freaks Can Invade Your Privacy (1976), available at http://explodingthephone.com/docs/db904 (declassified NSA memo describing how interfaces used by phone company employees to determine if a line was busy were subverted by outsiders to listen to phone conversations).
40 See, e.g., Craig Timberg & Lena H. Sun, Some Say Health-Care Site’s Problems Highlight Flawed Federal IT Policies, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/some-say-health-care-sites-problems-highlight-flawed-federal-it-policies/2013/10/09/d558da42-30fe-11e3-8627-c5d7de0a046b_story.html (“[T]he root cause is not simply a matter of flawed computer code but rather the government’s habit of buying outdated, costly and buggy technology. The U.S. government spends more than $80 billion a year for information-technology services, yet the resulting systems typically take years to build and often are cumbersome when they launch.”).
data breaches reported by federal agencies in 2013. Foreign governments have repeatedly penetrated federal systems, with the White House’s network being the latest to be breached by foreign hackers.

Given the extreme difficulty of writing secure software and the federal government’s poor track record in securing its own systems, it is extremely likely that the surveillance software that federal law enforcement agencies deploy will not be secure and will leave the computers of targets vulnerable to compromise by other parties.

C. Law enforcement agencies will increasingly need zero-day exploits

In order to exploit a security vulnerability in the software on a target’s computer, the target’s computer must either be running out-of-date software with a known software vulnerability, or agents must know of a vulnerability for which no update exists. As such, targets that regularly patch their software (or use software that automatically updates) may be much harder to infect with malware.

In order to be able to successfully compromise the computers of targets with up-to-date software, law enforcement and intelligence agencies are increasingly seeking to purchase or discover so called “zero-day” (or “0-day”) software exploits. Zero-day exploits are special computer code that exploits vulnerabilities in software that are not known to the manufacturer of the software program, and thus, for which no software update exists. Zero day exploits are extremely valuable, because there is no defense against them.

U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies have, in recent years, increasingly turned to zero-day exploits in order to gain access to the computers of high value targets. This has in

47 See Leyla Bilge & Tudor Dumitras, Before We Knew It: An Empirical Study of Zero-Day Attacks in the Real World, Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (2012), available at http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~tdumitra/public_documents/bilge12_zero_day.pdf (“A zero-day attack is a cyber attack exploiting a vulnerability that has not been disclosed publicly. There is almost no defense against a zero-day attack: while the vulnerability remains unknown, the software affected cannot be patched and anti-virus products cannot detect the attack through signature-based scanning.”).
turn fueled a largely unregulated market for zero-day exploits, in which government agencies are active and are often the highest bidder.50

Governments spend a lot of money to acquire zero-day exploits. Although there is little verifiable data about the market for such exploits, anecdotal reports suggest that the cost of commercial exploits can be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.51 These vulnerabilities are their most effective when no one else knows about them, so rather than alerting the companies whose software can be exploited, governments, including the United States, quietly exploit them.52 Quite simply, governments that rely on zero-day exploits have prioritized offense over defense.

Although zero-days undoubtedly make it easier to deliver malware to targets and to gain access to difficult-to-penetrate systems, there are significant collateral costs associated with the purchase and use of zero-days by governments. That is, by exploiting these vulnerabilities rather than notifying the companies responsible for the software, governments are putting their own citizens at risk.53 Several senior ex-U.S. government officials have acknowledged these risks, including ex-NSA/CIA director Michael Hayden,54 and ex-‘cyber czars’ Howard Schmidt55 and Richard Clarke.56

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See, e.g., The Digital Arms Trade, supra (“Other reputable customers, such as Western intelligence agencies, often pay higher prices. Mr Lindelauf reckons that America’s spies spend the most on exploits...[B]risk sales are partly driven by demand from defence contractors that see cyberspace as a “new battle domain”, says Matt Georgy, head of technology at Endgame, a Maryland firm that sells most of its best exploits for between $100,000 and $200,000.”); Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code, N.Y. Times, July 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (“But increasingly the businesses are being outbid by countries with the goal of exploiting the flaws in pursuit of the kind of success...that the United States and Israel achieved...”); Joseph Menn, Special Report: U.S. Cyberwar Strategy Stokes Fear of Blowback, Reuters, May 10, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/10/us-usa-cyberweapons-specialreport-idUSBRE9490EL20130510 (“Even as the U.S. government confronts rival powers over widespread Internet espionage, it has become the biggest buyer in a burgeoning gray market where hackers and security firms sell tools for breaking into computers.”).51

See Perlroth & Sanger, Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code, supra (describing hackers searching for “secret flaws in computer code that governments pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to learn about and exploit”).

52 Joseph Menn, U.S. Cyberwar Strategy Stokes Fear of Blowback, Reuters, May 10, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/10/us-usa-cyberweapons-specialreport-idUSBRE9490EL20130510 (“The core problem: Spy tools and cyber-weapons rely on vulnerabilities in existing software programs, and these hacks would be much less useful to the government if the flaws were exposed through public warnings. So the more the government spends on offensive techniques, the greater its interest in making sure that security holes in widely used software remain unrepaired.”).

53 Id. (“The strategy is spurring concern in the technology industry and intelligence community that Washington is in effect encouraging hacking and failing to disclose to software companies and customers the vulnerabilities exploited by the purchased hacks.”).

54 Id. (“Acknowledging the strategic trade-offs, former NSA director Michael Hayden said: ‘There has been a traditional calculus between protecting your offensive capability and strengthening your defense. It might be time now to readdress that at an important policy level, given how much we are suffering.’”).
Indeed, at a time when cyber-attacks are, according to government officials, one of the biggest threats faced by this country, the collateral damage associated with exploiting, rather than fixing, security vulnerabilities is a topic of considerable debate. For example, the President’s NSA Review Group observed last year that “[a] vulnerability that can be exploited on the battlefield can also be exploited elsewhere” and recommended that “US policy should generally move to ensure that Zero Days are quickly blocked, so that the underlying vulnerabilities are patched on US Government and other networks.” Moreover, “in almost all instances, for widely used code, it is in the national interest to eliminate software vulnerabilities rather than to use them for US intelligence collection. Eliminating the vulnerabilities—‘patching’ them—strengthens the security of US Government, critical infrastructure, and other computer systems.”

Because so little is known about how the FBI currently delivers malware to surveillance targets, we have no way of knowing how frequently it uses zero-days, or how many it has purchased or otherwise acquired. Even so, as the technology industry moves steadily towards automatic security updates, a practice largely motivated by cybersecurity concerns, the FBI

55 Id. (“’It’s pretty naïve to believe that with a newly discovered zero-day, you are the only one in the world that's discovered it,’” said Schmidt, who retired last year as the White House cybersecurity coordinator. ‘Whether it's another government, a researcher or someone else who sells exploits, you may have it by yourself for a few hours or for a few days, but you sure are not going to have it alone for long.’”); see also Perloth & Sanger, Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code, supra (“Governments are starting to say, ‘In order to best protect my country, I need to find vulnerabilities in other countries,’” said Howard Schmidt, a former White House cybersecurity coordinator. ‘The problem is that we all fundamentally become less secure.’”).

56 Menn, U.S. Cyberwar Strategy Stokes Fear of Blowback, supra (“Former White House cybersecurity advisors Howard Schmidt and Richard Clarke said in interviews that the government in this way has been putting too much emphasis on offensive capabilities that by their very nature depend on leaving U.S. business and consumers at risk. ‘If the U.S. government knows of a vulnerability that can be exploited, under normal circumstances, its first obligation is to tell U.S. users,’ Clarke said. ‘There is supposed to be some mechanism for deciding how they use the information, for offense or defense. But there isn’t.’”).

57 James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, and James Comey, the Director of the FBI, have both told Congress that cyber-attacks are the most serious national security threat faced by the United States. See Jim Garamone, Clapper Places Cyber at Top of Transnational Threat List, Armed Forces Press Service, Mar. 12, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119500; Greg Miller, FBI Director Warns of Cyberattacks; Other Security Chiefs Say Terrorism Threat Has Altered, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-director-warns-of-cyberattacks-other-security-chiefs-say-terrorism-threat-has-altered/2013/11/14/24f1b27a-4d53-11e3-9890-a1e0997fb0c0_story.html (“FBI Director James B. Comey testified Thursday that the risk of cyberattacks is likely to exceed the danger posed by al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks as the top national security threat to the United States and will become the dominant focus of law enforcement and intelligence services.”).


59 Id. at 37, 219.

60 Id. at 220.

may increasingly need zero-days in the future, as it will no longer be able to rely on targets running out of date, insecure software.

For example, the FBI has performed several successful watering hole attacks targeting visitors to websites that could only be accessed using Tor. In at least one of these operations, the FBI’s malware was delivered with code that exploited a security vulnerability for which a fix existed, and had been included in an update to the Tor Browser Bundle software that was made available a month before the FBI’s operation. Until September of 2014, the Tor Browser Bundle did not include a built-in security update mechanism. When updates were available, users had to go to the Tor Project website and download the updates for themselves. Many users did not do this, and so it is not surprising that FBI was able to successfully deliver malware to a number of Tor users without needing to exploit a zero-day vulnerability. Earlier this year, The Tor Project introduced a mechanism to more easily update the Tor browser software, and the organization has long been working on making security updates automatic.

The Department of Justice has told this Committee that one of the primary motivations for its proposal is the problem posed by anonymizing technologies like Tor. However, once the Tor Project completes the planned automatic security update feature, the successful compromise of Tor users will require zero day security vulnerabilities. This committee should therefore understand that if it wishes to provide law enforcement agencies the ability to identify and locate Tor users, then that ability will necessarily require blessing the exploitation of zero day vulnerabilities as a law enforcement technique. The raises significant public policy concerns.

**D. The tech industry’s embrace of cloud computing significantly complicates watering hole attacks.**

In August 2013, all of the websites hosted by Freedom Hosting—a service that hosted websites through the Tor network—began serving an error message with hidden code embedded

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62 See Poulsen, FBI Admits It Controlled Tor Servers Behind Mass Malware Attack, supra; Poulsen, Visit the Wrong Website, and the FBI Could End Up in Your Computer, supra. “Tor ‘is a network of virtual tunnels that allows people to improve their privacy and security.’ Originally developed by the Naval Research Lab and subsequently funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (‘DARPA’) to facilitate anonymous online activities by government personnel. Tor is an ‘onion routing’ technology which hides a user’s IP address, making it appear to originate from a Tor server rather than the actual address from which the user is connecting to the Internet.” Pell, supra, at 38 (citations omitted).

63 See Posting of Andy Isaacson, adi@hexapodia.org, to liberationtech@ lists.stanford.edu (Aug. 5, 2013) (available at https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/2013-August/010498.html) (stating that the fix to the exploit had been included in an update to the Tor Browser Bundle released on June 26, 2013).

64 See mikeperry, Tor Browser 3.6.5 and 4.0-alpha-2 Are Released, Tor Blog (Oct. 30, 2014), https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-365-and-40-alpha-2-are-released (describing the new update mechanism included in the 4.0 alpha-2 release of the Tor Browser bundle).

65 See phobos, Google Funds an Auto-Update for Vidalia, Tor Blog (June 6, 2008), https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-funds-auto-update-vidalia; see also Tor Browser Launcher, Micah Lee’s Blog, https://micahflee.com/torbrowser-launcher/ (describing an independent effort to create an automatic Tor security update delivery mechanism).

66 See Advisory Committee Materials at 171 (“The proposed amendment would better enable law enforcement to investigate and prosecute botnets and crimes involving Internet anonymizing technologies, both which pose substantial threats to members of the public.”); id. at 160 (“Currently, the Department obtains remote access warrants primarily to combat Internet anonymizing techniques.”).
That code was specifically designed to exploit a security flaw in a version of the Firefox web browser used to access Tor hidden servers. According to an FBI agent who later testified in an Irish court, the Freedom Hosting service hosted at least 100 child pornography websites. But the service also hosted a number of legitimate sites, including TorMail, a web-based email service that could only be accessed over the Tor network, and the Hidden Wiki, which one news site described as the “de facto encyclopedia of the Dark Net.” Even though these sites were serving lawful content, the FBI’s watering hole attack was performed in an overbroad manner, forcing all of the Freedom Hosting sites to deliver malware to visitors, not just those sites that were engaged in the distribution of illegal content.

We are now firmly in the age of cloud computing, in which hundreds of websites may share resources provided by the same powerful servers. Law-abiding Internet users have no way of knowing if the sites that they are visiting are hosted on the same physical server as a site that facilitates illegal conduct. That websites with a potential connection to illegal conduct are hosted on the same server as legitimate websites is not sufficient reason to permit law enforcement agencies to hack into the computers of every person who interacts with a particular server.

The court order that the FBI presumably obtained before launching watering hole attacks from the many Freedom Hosting websites is not public. As such, it is impossible to know what the FBI agents told the court, or what the court authorized. We do not know if the judge authorized watering hole attacks against all visitors to all sites running on the server owned by Freedom Hosting, or if the FBI agents exceeded the scope of the warrant. In any event, this episode demonstrates the importance of strict limits on bulk delivery of remote access malware, including through watering hole attacks.

III. The Proposed Amendment Substantively Expands the Government’s Powers and Should Be Addressed by Congress in the First Instance

The Federal Rules of Procedure are limited to “regulating procedure.” Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941). They may not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Although the proposed Committee Note purports to leave “constitutional questions” to be addressed in future case law, in practice the amendment will enlarge the government’s substantive power to conduct searches and will decide contested questions of law sub silentio.

By amending Rule 41, the government seeks to obtain the power to conduct a category of searches that it is currently barred from conducting. Where the government seeks to remotely search a computer the location of which is unknown, it does not now have a venue in which to

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69 Poulsen, FBI Admits It Controlled Tor Servers Behind Mass Malware Attack, supra.
71 Proposed Amendments Materials at 341.
apply for a warrant. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown [“In re Warrant”], 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 756–58 (S.D. Tex. 2013). In effect, the government lacks the substantive authority to conduct remote access searches in such circumstances. For that reason, the proposed amendment will almost certainly result in a marked increase in government use of remote hacking techniques and zero-day exploits. What looks like a procedural change actually creates a new substantive power: to use zero-day exploits, malware, spyware, and other software packages to circumvent privacy-protective proxy services, including at least one, Tor, which was created by the US government, and continues to receive US government funding.

The government’s desire to augment the investigative tools available to it is understandable, but the best, and indeed the proper way to address the government’s asserted needs is for it to present its demand to Congress. Lawmakers can then craft a legislative solution to any gap in the government’s search powers. As the Supreme Court has remarked, “In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 805–806 (2004)); see also City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (“The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”).

When presented with similar questions of invasive technological searches and surveillance, Congress has opted to step in and set detailed legislative rules. This was true of the wiretapping and bugging of wire, oral, and electronic communications through Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III” or the “Wiretap Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 2518, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1804. It was likewise true of searches of the contents of stored electronic communications and other digital data in the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703, and of real-time individualized telephony metadata collection in criminal and national security investigations in the two acts addressing pen registers, 18 U.S.C. § 3123 and 50 U.S.C. § 1842. Congress clearly has the capacity and the will to legislate in this area, and legislative action is preferable because it lends itself to setting substantive limits on questionable search practices in a way that procedural rulemaking does not. Indeed, members of Congress have begun to take note of this proposed amendment,72 and would likely welcome the chance to hold hearings and contemplate legislative reform. The Federal Rules should not be amended to give the government new power to conduct remote access searches using zero-day exploits and spyware to defeat privacy-protective tools like Tor. Congress should be given the opportunity to weigh the competing constitutional and policy concerns that the government’s proposal raises, and to craft detailed statutory language regulating how, when, and where the government may conduct “remote access” searches.

Instead of using the procedural rulemaking process to suddenly and substantially increase the government’s use of remote hacking techniques in criminal investigations, the Committee should reject the proposed amendment and leave the government to present its case to Congress and the American people.

IV. The Proposed Amendment Raises Significant Constitutional and Statutory Concerns.

A. Use of Zero-Day Exploits and Malware May Constitute an Unreasonable Search.

Under the Fourth Amendment, use of zero-day exploits or malware may constitute an unreasonable search. It is well established that some searches in the physical world are too intrusive, destructive, or dangerous to be reasonable:

The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis governs the method of execution of the warrant. Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are not subject to suppression.


Surgically removing evidence from a suspect’s body, using a powerful motorized battering ram to break into a residence, and “employ[ing] a flashbang device [to enter a house] with full knowledge that it will ‘likely’ ignite accelerants and cause a fire” have all been ruled unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Zero-day exploits may well pose analogous concerns. When the government unleashes zero-day exploits and malware, it will rarely be able to control who can intercept the code in transmission, whether it will reach its intended target, whether it will be copied and reused by others, and whether it will spread virally across the internet and cause damage to innocent persons and businesses. See Part II, *supra*. These factors are relevant to individual warrant applications, but also to the Advisory Committee’s consideration of the proposed Rule amendment, because these outcomes are entirely predictable as a natural result of the kinds of searches the government wants the authority to conduct.

For example, when the United States and Israel launched the Stuxnet cyber-attack against Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities several years ago, it quickly spread beyond the targeted location.

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73 *Winston v. Lee*, 470 U.S. 753, 759, 766–67 (1985) (holding that the health risks posed by the “compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence” make that search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); see also *Schmerber v. California*, 384 U.S. 757, 771–72 (1966) (requiring that a search involving drawing a suspect’s blood be “performed in a reasonable manner,” including that it be carried out by medical personnel in a medical environment); *Rochin v. California*, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (conduct by agents trying to obtain swallowed evidence, including “the forcible extraction of [the defendant’s] stomach’s contents,” violates due process).

74 *Langford v. Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty.*, 729 P.2d 822, 827 (Cal. 1987) (holding that, because a motorized battering ram can cause “potential danger from collapse of building walls and ceilings or through rupture of utility lines,” which could cause fires that “could threaten the safety not only of occupants, but of entire neighborhoods,” “routine deployment of the ram to enter dwellings must be considered presumptively unreasonable unless authorized in advance by a neutral magistrate, and unless exigent circumstances develop at the time of entry”).

75 *Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, Ohio*, 456 F.3d 555, 570 (6th Cir. 2006).

computer systems. Major U.S. companies, including Chevron, discovered that the Stuxnet software had infected their networks as well. If a piece of targeted malware developed with the vast resources of defense and national security agencies can go astray in this way, there is no reason to think law enforcement surveillance malware won’t do so too.

Although it took several years before Stuxnet was discovered by security researchers, the Stuxnet code and the zero-days it leveraged were extensively analyzed by a world-wide network of security experts. Although Microsoft rushed to develop and distribute patches for these vulnerabilities, criminals also took note, and exploited the same vulnerabilities for their own nefarious purposes.

More broadly, the use of malware and zero-day exploits is more invasive than other forms of permissible searches because the consequences and collateral damage associated with their use are inherently unpredictable and often irreversible. Because computers and the software they run are incredibly complicated systems, the consequences of their surreptitious penetration and exploitation by the government are inherently unpredictable. Malware can cause computer systems to fail in many unintended ways, causing the loss of property entirely unrelated to the government’s searches. For example, a piece of malware could—whether through poor design or unpredictable interaction with other software on the target’s computer—cause the destruction of data (such as family photos or document drafts) or the corruption of the operating system. The resulting data loss might or might not be reversible, depending on the circumstances.

The technological and internet-security implications of remote access searches are unavoidably complex. Before courts wade into the constitutional questions that the use of malware and zero-day exploits raise, it would be best for Congress to affirmatively address the wisdom and parameters of their use after informed public discussion. The policy and constitutional concerns that remote access searches raise are better suited to comprehensive legislative regulation than to authorization through procedural changes to the Federal Rules.

B. The Proposed Amendment Authorizes Searches That Can Only Be Carried Out Pursuant to a Title III Wiretap Order, and Would Be Illegal if Authorized by a Simple Rule 41 Warrant

Depending on the means used to conduct remote access searches and the information gathered, such searches may only be permissible pursuant to an order issued under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2518, or a surveillance warrant containing equivalent protections. A normal warrant application submitted under Rule 41 may be constitutionally insufficient and infirm.

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77 Sanger, supra (“An error in the code, they said, had led it to spread to an engineer’s computer when it was hooked up to the centrifuges. When the engineer left Natanz and connected the computer to the Internet, the American- and Israeli-made bug failed to recognize that its environment had changed. It began replicating itself all around the world.”).

78 King, Stuxnet Infected Chevron’s IT Network, supra.


The Wiretap Act, also known as Title III, applies when the government seeks to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications in real time. Because this sort of electronic surveillance raises, “understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens,” special protections are required. United States v. U.S. District Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972). Under Title III, these protections include requirements that the government particularly describe the place and person to be surveiled, that the government show it has exhausted other investigative procedures prior to seeking a Title III order, and that the court limit the duration of the surveillance and require minimization of interception of non-pertinent communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)–(5).

Moreover, unlike with search warrant applications, attorneys at DOJ’s Office of Enforcement Operations review each wiretap application before it is submitted to a court.81 Courts have also imposed Title III’s requirements on applications for warrants to authorize surreptitious video surveillance, even though such surveillance is not technically covered by the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas–Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510–11 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 884 (7th Cir. 1984). These requirements, for both wiretapping and video surveillance, derive from and are required by the Fourth Amendment. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58–59 (1967) (wiretapping); Torres, 751 F.2d at 884 (video surveillance).

Remote access searches can raise identical or analogous concerns. Certainly, if the government seeks to activate the built-in camera on a target computer, it must meet the heightened requirements for video surveillance. In re Warrant, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 759–61. If the government’s remote access surveillance software is configured to turn on the target computer’s microphone or to collect the contents of incoming or outgoing electronic or wire communications (such as emails, instant messages, or internet-based phone calls), Title III procedures would be required. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518. Further, “[s]oftware that can retrieve [other stored] information—Internet browser history, search terms, e-mail contents and contacts, ‘chat’, instant messaging logs, photographs, correspondence, and records of applications run, among other things”—also calls for heightened Fourth Amendment protections, because surreptitious and remote retrieval of such a “volume of information” raises constitutional concerns. In re Warrant, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 760. Electronic surveillance that “is identical in its indiscriminate character to wiretapping and bugging” cannot be authorized by a normal Rule 41 warrant. Torres, 751 F.2d at 885 (emphasis omitted).

Indeed, as explained above, remote access searches raise even more significant concerns in that malware and the exploitation of zero-day flaws can cause entirely unpredictable and irreversible damage to a target’s computer or data. Reducing the likelihood of, or mitigating the harms of, such unintended consequences would require significant technical expertise and

81 H.R. Rep. No. 112-546, at 10 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt546/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt546.pdf (“In a letter to Chairman Issa, the Deputy Attorney General acknowledged that the Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO), part of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, is ‘primarily responsible for the Department’s statutory wiretap authorizations.’ According to the letter, lawyers in OEO review these wiretap packages to ensure that they ‘meet statutory requirements and DOJ policies.’ When OEO completes its review of a wiretap package, federal law provides that the Attorney General or his designee—in practice, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division—revIEWS and authorizes it. Each wiretap package includes an affidavit which details the factual basis upon which the authorization is sought.”).
regulation of the manner in which the government develops and deploys its remote access software. Courts are ill-suited to oversee such mitigation efforts in the first instance.

Any malware, spyware, or other government software that remains on a target computer and collects information on an ongoing basis also implicates these concerns. Clandestine entry into a person’s computer, installation of software there, and use of that software to conduct real-time surveillance should require the heightened showing of a Title III order. A warrant issued under normal Rule 41 procedures that authorizes an ongoing search will necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment; restrictions are needed “to guarantee that . . . [these searches] occur[] only when there is a genuine need for [them] and only to the extent that [they are] needed.” Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 250 (1979). Yet, it is clear that the government is already collecting information about computer users on an ongoing basis using remote access malware without obtaining a Title III order or equivalent judicial process. Approving the proposed amendment would give sanction to this highly problematic practice.

In an investigation in Washington State in 2007, the FBI applied for a hybrid order to justify its installation and monitoring of the CIPAV surveillance software: a Rule 41 warrant to authorize transmission and installation of the software and its one-time use to collect location, identification, and other data from the target computer, combined with a pen register order to authorize ongoing collection of “routing and destination addressing information for electronic communications originating from the activating computer.” In re Search of Any Computer Accessing Electronic Message(s) Directed to Administrator(s) of MySpace Account “Timberlinebombinfo” and Opening Message(s) Delivered to that Account by the Government, MJ-07-88 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2007), available at https://www.eff.org/document/fbicipav-08pdf. A hybrid order of this type cannot substitute for the strictures of Title III.

A pen register order is intended to be served on a “person or entity providing wire or electronic communication service,” 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1), to compel their assistance in turning over “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information,” id. § 3127(3). Installation of spyware on a person’s computer and contemporaneous monitoring of information about all types of electronic communications originating from that computer is a good deal more invasive, because it relies on entry into a person’s private space and maintenance of a presence there to collect information. This is, in effect, a trespassory search. Cf. United States v. Jones 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that a Fourth Amendment search occurred when “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information”). It is also the kind of unusually intrusive surveillance to which the heightened standard of Title III applies. The government appears to want to use the pen register statute to authorize what a Rule 41 warrant cannot standing alone, but that defies common sense. As Judge Stephen Smith explained while rejecting a variant of the government’s hybrid order theory in another context, “[s]urely if these various statutory provisions were intended to give birth to a new breed of electronic surveillance, one would expect Congress to have openly acknowledged paternity somewhere along the way. This is especially so given that no other form of electronic surveillance has th[is] mixed statutory parentage.” In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 764–65 (S.D. Tex. 2005). Invasive monitoring carried out by

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installing malware on a target’s computer should require a Title III order—or new congressional legislation—not a cobbled-together patchwork of lesser permissions.

Adopting the proposed amendment to Rule 41 risks facilitating violations of Title III and deciding by administrative rulemaking a question better left to Congressional regulation—how to regulate and circumscribe the controversial and invasive search techniques at issue here.

C. The Proposed Amendment Will Facilitate Violations of the Fourth Amendment’s Particularity Requirement and Will Result in Searches of Non-Suspects as to Whom There Is No Probable Cause.

The proposed amendment would allow police to remotely search many people’s computers using a single warrant, often without particularly describing those computers or demonstrating probable cause as to their owners or users. A warrant that does not particularly describe the place to be searched and things to be seized is invalid. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (citing U.S. Const. amend IV). For this reason, courts have been skeptical of warrants authorizing searches of multiple locations not owned by the same person.83 In the context of physical searches, “[t]he general rule is that a warrant for a building that has multiple units must specify the individual unit that is the subject of the search to satisfy the particularity requirement.”84 The same concerns and rules should apply when police search digital “occupancies.” Indeed, “[t]he need for particularity . . . is especially great in the case of eavesdropping.” Berger, 388 U.S. at 56. So, too, for remote access hacking.

Further, a search warrant that demonstrates probable cause as to one suspect or location does not thereby justify any search anywhere. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978) (second emphasis added) (“[V]alid warrants may be issued to search any property, whether or not occupied by a third party, at which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime will be found.”).85 The Wiretap Act illustrates application of this principle to warrants authorizing invasive electronic surveillance: the government must demonstrate not only that there is probable cause of commission of a qualifying criminal offense, but also that there is probable cause for belief “that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception” and that the facilities or places to be wiretapped or bugged are being used in connection with the offense or

83 “[I]n the case of multi-location search warrants, the magistrate must be careful to evaluate each location separately. ‘A search warrant designating more than one person or place to be searched must contain sufficient probable cause to justify its issuance as to each person or place named therein.’” Greenstreet v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 41 F.3d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting People v. Easley, 671 P.2d 813, 820 (Cal. 1983)).
84 Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1045 n.173 (2010) (citing Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 2000)). See also United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 325–26 (7th Cir. 1955) (“For purposes of satisfying the Fourth Amendment, searching two or more apartments in the same building is no different than searching two or more completely separate houses.”); United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2011) (warrant defective where issuing judge was not informed of building’s size or number of residential units and was incapable of making probable cause determination of defendant’s control of entire multi-family building).
85 See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 409 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Mass. 1980) (“In the case of a search warrant, . . . the affidavit must, in order to establish probable cause, contain enough information for the issuing magistrate to determine that the items sought are related to the criminal activity under investigation, and that they may reasonably be expected to be located in the place to be searched.” (emphasis added)).
used by the targeted person. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)–(d). Remote, surreptitious computer searches should be held to the same standard.

Authorizing the kinds of remote access searches that the government seeks to conduct threatens to violate the Fourth Amendment’s particularity and probable cause requirements in several ways. First, if the government configures a website or server to deliver malware to the computer of every person who visits it (a watering hole attack), it will likely end up searching the computers of people who it cannot particularly identify or describe and as to whom it lacks probable cause. There do exist a small subset of websites or servers where all access may violate the law (websites that do nothing more than distribute child pornography might qualify). However, issuing a search warrant authorizing the surreptitious delivery of malware onto the computers of an unknown number of targets raises serious legal and policy questions. Moreover, even if orders for bulk installation of malware are deemed to be proper, the vast majority of websites or servers that the government might commandeer to deliver malware to visitors’ computers will be visited by both legitimate targets and non-targets alike. For example, members of the press, researchers, policymakers, and attorneys regularly visit websites associated with terrorist groups, cyber-criminals, and drug dealers.86 Were courts to authorize the installation of malware to all visitors to these and other types of websites, the government would undoubtedly end up searching the computers of innocent people who are not engaged in any crime, who have a perfectly valid reason to have visited the site, and as to whom there is no probable cause.

The same may be true of more targeted delivery of remote access hacking software. For example, when the government delivered spyware to a suspect in a 2007 investigation in Washington, it did so by creating a fake Associated Press story and then sending a link to one of the suspect’s social media accounts.87 **“When the suspect clicked on the link, the hidden FBI software [installed itself on his computer and] sent his location and Internet Protocol information to agents.”**88 Had the suspect forwarded the link to acquaintances, posted it on social media, or otherwise distributed it, people as to whom the government lacked probable cause would likely have clicked on the link and triggered a search of their computers. The same would have happened if the government had posted the link to a public portion of the suspect’s social media account (it is not known whether the government did so because public information about the search is limited). Likewise, if an internet search engine had indexed the fake page,89 any internet user could have happened upon the link during a search, clicked on it, and triggered a search of their computer. Once released into the world, government malware is difficult to contain.90 A warrant could not have authorized these collateral, but foreseeable searches because

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86 Indeed, the reason the American public learned about the Target data breach (and many others) is because a journalist regularly reads invitation-only cyber-crime forums. See Brian Krebs, *Cards Stolen in Target Breach Flood Underground Markets*, Krebs on Security (Dec. 20, 2013), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/12/cards-stolen-in-target-breach-flood-underground-markets/#more-24093.


88 Carter, *supra*; see also Johnson, *supra*.

89 See Google, Crawling & Indexing, http://www.google.com/insidesearch/howsearchworks/crawling-indexing.html (“We use software known as ‘web crawlers’ to discover publicly available webpages.”).

the government would have lacked probable cause as to the people searched, and could not have particularly described the places to be searched or digital files to be seized.

Individual magistrate judges reviewing warrant applications may be able to address some of these concerns in some cases. But because these defects will pervade remote access warrant applications and are entirely predictable, the best course is to reject the proposed amendment and allow Congress the opportunity to set detailed rules concerning particularity and probable cause.

D. The Proposed Amendment Weakens Rule 41’s Notice Requirement

The proposed amendment modifies Rule 41’s notice requirement so that for remote access searches the government “must make reasonable efforts to serve a copy of the warrant on the person whose property was searched or whose information was seized or copied.” 91 The means of service must be “reasonably calculated to reach that person.” 92 This departs from the normal requirement that “[t]he officer executing the warrant must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person” subject to the search. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(1)(C) (emphasis added).

The proposed language clearly contemplates searches for which no notice can be provided. Indeed, the circumstances in which the government will likely seek authority to conduct remote access searches all but guarantee that notice will be difficult if not impossible to provide in many or most cases. If, for example, the government seeks to learn the identity and location of a particular internet user, it might often be the case that all it learns is that the user is connected to the internet from an IP address associated with a coffee shop in a large urban area. It is not at all clear that any means would be available to the government to reliably provide notice in that likely typical scenario.

But failure to provide notice “casts strong doubt on [a warrant’s] constitutional adequacy.”  United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Berger, 388 U.S. at 60). As the Ninth Circuit has explained,

[a] warrant [i]s constitutionally defective [if it] fail[s] to provide explicitly for notice within a reasonable, but short, time subsequent to the surreptitious entry. . . . We take this position because surreptitious searches and seizures of intangibles strike at the very heart of the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. The mere thought of strangers walking through and visually examining the center of our privacy interest, our home, arouses our passion for freedom as does nothing else. That passion, the true source of the Fourth Amendment, demands that surreptitious entries be closely circumscribed.

  
  Id.; see also United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[I]f a delay in notice is to be allowed, the court should nonetheless require the officers to give the appropriate person notice of the search within a reasonable time after the covert entry.”).

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91 Proposed Amendments Materials at 340 (emphasis added).
92 Id. (emphasis added).
Surreptitious entry into a repository of a person’s electronic files, containing digital analogues of her diaries, address books, letters, and photo albums, raises no less important concerns. See United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2009) (“There is no question that computers are capable of storing immense amounts of information and often contain a great deal of private information. Searches of computers therefore often involve a degree of intrusiveness much greater in quantity, if not different in kind, from searches of other containers.”). Even when police seek to search only a limited set of data on a computer, the importance of notice is paramount. Computers “store and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers in a single place[, which] increases law enforcement’s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search into a person's private affairs.” United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009). And even if no data is copied during the search, the surreptitious entry itself raises concerns, particularly when it is achieved using means that may expose the computer user to malicious incursions by other actors taking advantage of the government’s means and method of entry.93

Another problem with the proposed amendment is that it will allow the government to provide notice to either “the person whose property was searched or whose information was seized or copied.”94 When those are different people, notice should be given to both. If, for example, the government were to conduct a remote access search of a computer owned by one person but used by others, it could interpret the rule to allow it to provide notice to only the owner, but not to the person whose files (“information”) were actually seized or copied. This would be so even if the seized files were located in a password-protected folder and were clearly identifiable as being the property of someone other than the computer’s owner. The computer’s owner may fail to, or be ordered not to, inform the target of the search upon receiving notice from the government. Thus, the target might never learn of the search, and therefore never be able to challenge its constitutionality. To avoid this problem, “or” should be replaced with “and.”

Finally, even in situations where the government’s efforts to provide notice to the proper person eventually succeed, notice will often be delayed. An increase in delayed-notice searches occasioned by the proposed amendment raises concerns. In the context of Title III, Congress has implicitly authorized covert entry and delayed notice when installing and operating surveillance equipment, but only when the government complies with “detailed restrictions” that “guarantee that wiretapping or bugging occurs only when there is a genuine need for it and only to the extent that it is needed.” Dalia, 441 U.S. at 250; see 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (imposing duration and minimization requirements on wiretap orders). Similar safeguards have been imposed by courts to regulate video surveillance. See, e.g., Biasucci, 786 F.2d at 510–11. Delayed notice may be permissible if it is of short duration and reviewed by a judge, but it has the potential to interfere with substantive Fourth Amendment rights if too heavily, widely, or extensively used. To the extent “remote access” searches are permissible at all, any delay of notice must be specifically

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93 The proposed amendment may also violate the knock-and-announce rule. As the Supreme Court has explained, the Fourth Amendment does not “permit[] a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for [an] entire category of criminal activity.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 388 (1997). Neither the government nor courts may “dispens[e] with case-by-case evaluation of the manner in which a search [is] executed,” including when it comes to knock-and-announce. Id. at 392. To the extent that remote access search warrants are permissible at all, unannounced searches may sometimes be justified by a specific factual showing under the circumstances of a particular case. But a categorical rule permitting unannounced searches may violate the Fourth Amendment.

94 Proposed Amendments Materials at 340 (emphasis added).
justified in the individual case, notice must be given “within a reasonable time after the covert
entry,” and the restrictions currently imposed on wiretap and video surveillance warrants must be
observed. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1336–37.

It is perhaps for the very reason that remote access searches raise intractable notice
problems that neither Congress nor the courts have yet seen fit to permit the government the
general authority to search individuals whose locations are entirely unknown. It may be that the
inability to guarantee notice in the mine-run of remote access searches could be overcome in
some technological or legislative manner. But that possibility is best left to congressional inquiry
in the first instance.

V. The Proposed Amendment Raises Wide-Ranging Questions That the Committee
Should Consider Now, Because Those Questions are Unlikely to Be Addressed in
Individual Cases for Years to Come

The Advisory Committee should proceed with extreme caution before expanding the
government’s authority to conduct remote electronic searches. As explained above, the proposed
amendment would significantly expand the government’s authority to conduct searches that raise
troubling and wide-ranging constitutional, statutory, and policy questions. If the Committee
approves the proposed amendment, courts are unlikely to address these questions in individual
cases, at least not in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is vital that the Committee carefully
consider all of the implications of the proposed amendment now. If those implications cannot be
adequately addressed through a change to the Federal Rules—which they cannot—the
Committee’s best course would be to reject the proposal and leave it to Congress to take up the
question.

Even if the Advisory Committee determines that the proposed amendment will “govern[]
only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the litigants’ rights are ‘enforced,’” and will not
“alter[] ‘the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’” Shady Grove
alterations in original), it should still be reticent to approve the amendment. The constitutional
questions raised by the amendment include what limitations the particularity, probable cause, and
reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment impose on remote access searches. These
will likely not be addressed by courts for years, if ever. Moreover, important policy questions
involving cybersecurity and government exploitation of internet and software vulnerabilities are
implicated, as are conflicts with the text and intent of the Wiretap Act. In order to prevent
violations of the Fourth Amendment and an unchecked expansion of government power, this
Committee should grapple with these issues now. The Department of Justice should request the
authority it seeks from Congress, so as to permit a public debate about the propriety of the
intrusive techniques it proposes to use and about possible alternatives that Congress would be in
a unique position to craft.

There are several reasons why courts are unlikely to address Fourth Amendment limits on
remote access searches in the near future. For one, warrant applications are considered by judges
ex parte and without adversarial argument. While magistrate judges are experienced in assessing
general questions of particularity and probable cause in run-of-the-mill warrant applications, they
are likely to be ill-equipped to provide robust review of applications for remote access warrants without adversarial briefing, particularly when the search warrant applications do not make clear that agents are seeking permission to hack into the computers of surveillance targets. Full appraisal of these applications requires technical expertise about electronic data storage issues, internet architecture, and cybersecurity. Applications that appear reasonable on their face in light of a magistrate judge’s limited technical understanding may in fact fail the particularity and reasonableness requirement upon closer study. But without detailed technical knowledge—or adversarial briefing explaining the issues—many of these concerns will go unnoticed and unaddressed.

Further, orders granting or denying warrants are rarely published and are usually sealed. The likelihood of magistrate judges *sua sponte* publishing detailed opinions analyzing Fourth Amendment issues involved in electronic searches is particularly low when they are unable to independently identify the constitutional infirmities of the warrant application. Indeed, although the government has already sought warrants to authorize remote access searches, there is only one published opinion of a magistrate judge grappling with the Fourth Amendment issues involved. *See In re Warrant*, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753. There is no telling how long it will be until there is another.

Additionally, notice may be delayed for significant periods of time, thus forestalling the time when the target of a remote access search could challenge its constitutionality. *See* Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)–(c). And even when notice is given, ex post judicial review is limited by doctrines precluding or discouraging a ruling on the constitutionality of the government’s conduct. In criminal prosecutions, defendants may challenge the constitutionality of a search through motions to suppress. In response to such motions, the government is likely to argue that investigating officers were relying in good faith on a facially valid warrant when conducting the search. *See United States v. Leon*, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Courts frequently address the good-faith exception before—and to the exclusion of—the substantive Fourth Amendment claim when denying motions to suppress. Thus, even in cases where a remote access warrant fails the particularity, probable cause, or reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment, courts will generally avoid ruling on the issue.

The doctrine of qualified immunity functions in much the same way to preclude substantive adjudication in suits seeking damages for violations of Fourth Amendment rights.

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95 See Laura Donahue, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Remarks at Panel on the Legal and Policy Implications of Hacking by Law Enforcement at Yale Law School (“Remarks by Laura Donahue”), at 18:00–21:40 (Feb. 18, 2014), http://vimeo.com/88165230 (stating knowledge of dozens of cases involving government use of hacking tools, but explaining that most of the relevant magistrate judge orders are sealed).

96 Id.

97 See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 646 F.3d 1124, 1128 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The district court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress based on the Leon good-faith exception. In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the underlying question of probable cause.”); United States v. Woodbury, 511 F.3d 93, 99 (1st Cir. 2007) (“We need not address the defendant’s particularity arguments because we find that the Leon good-faith exception applies.”); United States v. Chern, 184 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1999) (“If the Leon good-faith exception applies, we end our analysis and affirm the district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress. . . . If the good-faith exception applies, we need not reach the question of probable cause.”).

98 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Suits for injunctive and declaratory relief are likely to be barred by standing doctrine, on the basis that a person targeted by a remote
Qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” *Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts have discretion to address qualified immunity before determining whether the government has violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights, *id.* at 236, and they frequently do so. Courts often dispose of cases seeking relief for Fourth Amendment violations by concluding that there was no clearly established law at the time of the search which would have put law enforcement on notice that their conduct was unconstitutional. *See, e.g.*, *Messerschmidt v. Millender*, 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012) (finding qualified immunity and declining to rule on whether facts stated in a warrant application established probable cause). The issues raised by warrants for remote, extra-district electronic searches are necessarily novel because the Federal Rules have not heretofore authorized them. Therefore, the government will almost certainly argue that qualified immunity applies. Perversely, the very absence of case law addressing these searches will mean there is likely to be little development of case law addressing the constitutionality of these searches in the future.

Accordingly, the time to address the constitutional concerns raised by the proposed amendment is now. Speculation that these important issues will be fully dealt with in future case law is unlikely to prove correct, at least in the near future. The significant issues involved counsel caution, and the right course is to reject the proposed amendment and let Congress act.

These problems are exacerbated by the government’s lack of candor about the nature of its remote access searches. The DOJ’s explanations of its remote access search capability in the sample warrant applications, *supra*, in warrant applications actually filed in federal court, *supra*, and in its recent memoranda to this Committee fail to fully describe the nature and invasiveness of its contemplated and completed remote access searches. As described above, one use of the proposed amendment will be to enable searches involving malware or spyware that take advantage of zero-day vulnerabilities and that travel over the open internet. But nothing in the government’s descriptions of its “network investigative techniques” or “remote network techniques” would put a magistrate judge (or, for that matter, a member of this Committee) on notice that the government seeks to hack into the computers of targets, exploiting publicly unknown security flaws in the software on those devices using techniques that may create significant cybersecurity collateral damage to the target and to others, and that may fail the reasonableness and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

access search in the past will not be able to prove a likelihood that they will be subjected to such a search again in the future. *See City of L.A. v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).

99 *See* Advisory Committee Materials at 181–235.

100 *See, e.g.*, Affidavit of Justin E. Noble in Support of Application for Search Warrant, *In re Search of Network Investigative Technique (“NIT”) for E-mail Address 512SocialMedia@gmail.com*, No. 12-mj-748-ML (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2012); Third Amended Affidavit of William A. Gallegos In Support of Application for Search Warrant, *In re Search of Network Investigative Technique (“NIT”) for Email Address texan.slayer@yahoo.com*, No. 12-sw-05685-KMT (D. Colo. Dec. 11, 2012).

101 *See, e.g.*, Advisory Committee Materials 200–03.

102 *See, e.g.*, *id.* 216.

103 *See Remarks by Laura Donahue, supra*, at 21:45–22:17 (“Often [the government’s] applications do not include detailed technology, or technological explanation as to how it is actually going to be executed, enter the computer, exactly what information is going to be obtained, which other devices might be infected, how many devices may be infected, and so on.”).
It is crucial that the government provide full and accurate information to magistrate judges (and to this Committee) when seeking authority to conduct novel and invasive searches. The Advisory Committee should not authorize new search powers without ensuring that the duty of candor has been and will be satisfied. At a minimum, the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the proposed amendment should speak to this issue.

VI. Recommendations

The ACLU recommends that the Committee reject the proposed amendment to Rule 41. The proposed amendment raises myriad technological, policy, and constitutional concerns. Some of those might be addressed through careful regulation; others are inherent in even the most circumscribed versions of the proposal. The dramatic expansion of investigative power that the government seeks should not be authorized through a change to the Rules of Procedure. Rather, if the government wants this power, it should seek congressional action.

Should Congress decide that remote access searches in the situations covered by the proposed amendment are to be permitted, the ACLU would recommend a set of restrictions to mitigate its concerns, including:

- Require a Title III order for any remote access search that collects information on an ongoing basis or forces a target’s device to generate or collect new data (such as by turning on a computer’s webcam or microphone);
- Only permit use of malware against specific and particularly described persons. Watering hole attacks, particularly when performed against sites that share computing resources with other innocent websites, present significant public policy and legal issues which make such attacks problematic;
- Require that the government make explicit in warrant applications that it intends to conduct a remote access search using malware and that it will exploit security vulnerabilities in the software on the target’s device to do so, and require the government to describe in detail how the malware will work, how many computers it will affect, how long it will remain installed on those computers, what code will remain on those computers indefinitely, the extent to which there may be irreversible changes or damage to devices, the extent to which insertion of the malware requires the assistance of a third party service provider, what impact there will be on the security of computers of targets and non-target third parties, whether it is reasonably foreseeable that government malware could malfunction, target the wrong people, or fall into the wrong hands, what technical experts have

104 Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (“[O]mitting . . . highly relevant information [about a search of electronic data] is inconsistent with the government's duty of candor in presenting a warrant application. A lack of candor in this or any other aspect of the warrant application must bear heavily against the government in the calculus of any subsequent motion to return or suppress the seized data.”); cf. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More than a Pen Register, and Less than a Wiretap: What the Stingray Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 Yale J. L. & Tech. 134, 162 (2013) (discussing government’s lack of candor to judges when seeking authority to use “Stingray” cell phone tracking devices).
been consulted prior to submission of the application, and the basis for the
determinations made with regards to the issues above;

• Prohibit the impersonation of third parties by law enforcement agencies in their
efforts to deliver malware to targets, unless those third parties provide informed
consent in writing;

• Require that any assistance of a service provider in delivering the malware be
consensual or explicitly required by the warrant;

• Require law enforcement malware to include identifying markings in the
computer code, such that if the code is subsequently discovered by security
researchers, they will know who to contact if, for example, the malware
malfunctions, spreads, or ends up on the computers of non-suspects;

• Prohibit the use by law enforcement of zero-day exploits in general-use software
and hardware; and

• Prohibit the approval of warrants in which there is a reasonable likelihood that
execution of the warrant will result in damage to third parties who are not the
intended law enforcement target.

Many of these proposed constraints are beyond this Committee’s power to enact. The
ACLU recommends that the Committee not adopt the proposed amendment and allow the
government to seek legislation in Congress.

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Thank you for your consideration of these comments.

Respectfully,

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TAB 2
Testimony of Kevin S. Bankston,
Policy Director of New America’s Open Technology Institute

On Proposed Amendments to Rule 41
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Before The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on Criminal Rules

November 5, 2014

Members of the Committee,

Thank you for allowing New America’s Open Technology Institute (“OTI”)\(^1\) to testify and share our concerns about the proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 regarding “remote access” searches of electronic devices.\(^2\)

I am here today to question the basic and quite substantive premise implicit in the proposed amendment: that “remote access” searches by the government—or more accurately, the government’s surreptitious hacking into computers or smartphones in order to plant malware that will send data from those devices back to the government—are allowed by the Fourth Amendment.

Based on precedent almost half a century old, we believe the proposed amendment authorizes searches that are unconstitutional for lack of adequate procedural protections tailored to counter those searches’ extreme intrusiveness—much like the New York state electronic

\(^1\) New America’s Open Technology Institute (“OTI”), [http://newamerica.org/oti/](http://newamerica.org/oti/).

\(^2\) Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure: Request for Comment (Proposed Amendments Draft), 338-342 (Aug. 2014), available at [http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CR-2014-0004-0001](http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CR-2014-0004-0001) (authorizing issuance of warrants “to use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored data” in cases where the target computer’s location “has been concealed by technological means” or in a computer crime investigation where the computers to be searched “have been damaged without authorization and are located in five or more districts”).
eavesdropping law that was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in *Berger v. New York* nearly 50 years ago.\(^3\) There, the court held that because electronic eavesdropping “by its very nature...involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope,” authority to conduct such surveillance should only be granted “under the most precise and discriminate circumstances” in order to ensure that the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement is met.\(^4\)

In response to that 1967 case, Congress in 1968 passed the federal wiretapping statute often referred to as Title III.\(^5\) There, Congress addressed the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment concerns by providing a precise and discriminate warrant procedure for wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping,\(^6\) with procedural safeguards so demanding that commentators routinely refer to Title III orders as “super-warrants.”\(^7\)

Foremost among those Title III safeguards are the four that are intended to enforce the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement consistent with the *Berger* decision, which held that “[t]he need for particularity...is especially great in the case of eavesdropping.”\(^8\) The court in *US v. Torres*,\(^9\) the first of many circuit courts to find that these four *Berger*-derived requirements are also constitutionally required for video surveillance,\(^10\) summarized them well:

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\(^3\) 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
\(^4\) Id. at 56.
\(^6\) Id. at §2518.
\(^8\) *Berger*, 388 U.S. at 56.
The judge must certify that [1] “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous,” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c), and that [2] the warrant must contain “a particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates,” § 2518(4)(c), [3] must not allow the period of interception to be “longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days” (though renewals are possible), § 2518(5), and [4] must require that the interception “be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under [Title III].”

As the Torres court concluded, “Each of these four requirements is a safeguard against electronic surveillance that picks up more information than is strictly necessary and so violates the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of particular description.”

Title III, consistent with Berger and the Fourth Amendment’s demand of reasonableness, also includes a clear requirement of service of notice on the target of the surveillance soon after the surveillance is completed— with no exceptions for failure to notify. And finally, Title III includes a number of additional “super-warrant” checks and balances intended by Congress to further ensure the reasonableness of the surveillance to balance its intrusiveness, including a requirement that such surveillance only be used in the investigation of specifically identified serious crimes. Only with such super-warrant protections in place have warrants for electronic surveillance been found constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

Today, nearly half a century later, we are faced with a digital surveillance technique that is substantially more invasive than the analog electronic surveillance techniques of the past. Yet this

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11 Torres, 751 F.2d at 883-84.
12 Id. at 884.
14 18 U.S.C. §2516(1); see also Torres, 751 F.2d at 890-91 (summarizing additional Title III requirements).
Committee, without any support from Congress or the courts, is poised to explicitly authorize warrants for such remote access searches with no additional protections at all and with a constitutionally novel allowance for no notice in certain cases. This is particularly concerning because the procedural protections required in cases of eavesdropping, wiretapping and video surveillance are even more necessary here, when the devices to which the government seeks access can contain an unprecedented wealth of private data—our digital “papers and effects.”

Indeed, the one published decision to address a warrant application regarding a remote access search—Magistrate Judge Smith’s opinion in Houston last year, the In Re Warrant case—rejected the application based not only on Rule 41 considerations but also based on a failure to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularly requirement, including the enhanced Berger/Torres particularity requirements typically applied to electronic surveillance.\footnote{In Re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758-61 (S.D. Tex. 2013).}

The proposed amendment, in attempting to address the Rule 41 issue raised by Judge Smith’s opinion, necessarily also makes a substantive judgment regarding the Fourth Amendment’s application to remote access searches. It does so first by authorizing remote access searches where the location of the target computer is unknown—a type of search that Judge Smith found was a \emph{per se} violation of the requirement that the “place to be searched” be particularly described\footnote{Id. at 758-760.}—and second by choosing not to insist that remote access searches meet the Berger/Torres requirements that undoubtedly apply.

Those requirements undoubtedly apply, as Judge Smith held,\footnote{Id at 760-61} because remote access searches implicate and amplify all of the same problems as electronic surveillance, by virtue of providing access to an even greater wealth of private information. As he described, computers contain—and the government’s remotely installed software has the capacity to access—“Internet browser history, search terms, e-mail contents and contacts, ‘chat’, instant messaging logs, photographs, correspondence, and records of applications run, among other
things....”

Not only can government software secretly “search the computer's hard drive, random access memory, and other storage media,” but it can also “activate the computer’s built-in camera[,] generate latitude and longitude coordinates for the computer’s location[,] and[] transmit [all of that] extracted data to the FBI....”

Like Judge Smith, the Supreme Court recently recognized the unprecedented amount of private data that may be stored on an electronic device such as a computer or a smartphone. As the Court explained in this year’s Riley v. California decision regarding searches of cell phones incident to arrest, many cell phones “are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.” These devices, with “immense storage capacity,” can hold “every picture [their users] have taken, or every book or article they have read,” and “even the most basic phones that sell for less than $20 might hold photographs, picture messages, text messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar, a thousand-entry phone book, and so on.”

Stand-alone computers that could be reached by a remote access search can store even more—and even more types—of private data than the smartphones that the Supreme Court sought to protect against unreasonable searches. Ultimately, as the Supreme Court explicitly held, the search of a modern electronic device such as a smartphone or a computer is more privacy invasive than even “the most exhaustive search of a house”.

In this technological context, the constitutional necessity of applying the Berger/Torres particularity requirements to remote access searches is clear. That need—especially in regard to minimizing the search of devices or the seizure of data that are not particularly identified in the warrant—is amplified even further by several other risks that have been discussed at length by other commentators as well as Judge

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18 Id. at 760.
19 Id. at 755.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 2491.
These risks include the privacy risk to non-suspects who share the target computer, which might be a public terminal at a library or a café; the risk that the government’s software may spread to non-target computers; the possibility, in cases of botnet investigations or so-called “watering hole” attacks, that thousands or even millions of computers may be infected with remote access software; and the risk that software used to remotely access any of those computers may end up causing damage, either by altering or deleting data or creating security vulnerabilities that may be exploited by others.

Indeed, it may be that remote access searches carry so many risks that they are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment or as a policy matter even if they satisfy the Berger/Torres requirements; notably, neither the courts nor Congress have yet addressed those questions. This brings us back to my starting proposition: that by explicitly authorizing remote access searches, the proposed amendment represents a substantive judgment regarding the constitutionality of those searches and a policy judgment regarding the appropriateness of such searches, regardless of the Committee Note’s claim that “[t]he amendment does not address constitutional questions.

The proposed amendment’s explicit authorization of remote access searches where the computer location is not known, in the face of the one published decision on the matter finding that such searches are per

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23 In Re Warrant, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 759.
24 Id.
25 Id.
27 See, e.g., ACLU Comments at 9-10, 17-18; CDT Comments at 8-9.
28 Proposed Amendments Draft at 341.
se violations of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, represents a substantive legal judgment.

The proposed amendment’s unprecedented allowance for situations where notice may not reach the target, in the context of case law that has never provided any exception to the rule that notice must be served, is a substantive legal judgment.

The proposed amendment’s authorization of remote access searches without requiring satisfaction of the Berger/Torres particularity requirements, contrary to the one published decision finding that those requirements do apply, is a substantive legal judgment. So too would it be a substantive legal judgment for the Committee to include those requirements, which just further demonstrates how the substantive and procedural questions on this issue are inextricably intertwined.

Ultimately, such substantive expansions of the government’s authority as those represented in this proposed amendment are not the province of this Committee. We therefore urge that this Committee reject the proposed amendment to Rule 41 and leave these substantive constitutional and policy questions where they belong, in the courts and in Congress.

Thank you for you consideration, and I welcome your questions.
TAB 3
Written Statement

Of

The Center for Democracy & Technology

Before

The Judicial Conference

Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules

Friday, October 24, 2014

Members of the Committee, thank you for allowing the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) to testify on proposed changes to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCrimP). CDT is a nonprofit public interest organization dedicated to promoting policies and technical standards that protect civil liberties such as privacy and free expression globally.

CDT recognizes that law enforcement faces legitimate challenges in determining how to issue search warrants for computers with concealed locations in investigations. We also recognize the negative impact of malware, botnets, and illicit online activities undertaken using anonymity techniques that may obfuscate location. However, we believe the solution to this complex problem should arise through public and legislative debate. The proposal before the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules to modify Rule 41 of the FRCrimP has significant implications for open legal and policy issues, as well as broad technological consequences affecting the privacy of computer users worldwide. We believe the Judicial Conference should withdraw the proposed changes to Rule 41 from its rulemaking process, and that the proposal should instead be deliberated in Congress.

I. The Proposed Amendment

Rule 41 of the FRCrimP is of fundamental importance to how the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for government search and seizure applies in practice. Any changes to the Rule should be viewed in this context and carefully avoid creating new risks to privacy and security. However, the proposed modifications to FRCrimP Rule 41 would have significant legal and technical implications, described below, that merit open consideration by Congress, rather than a rulemaking proceeding of the Judicial Conference.

Under the current FRCrimP Rule 41, magistrates with authority in a particular district can issue warrants for the search and seizure of property:

a. Located within the district at the time of the search;

b. Located within the district at the time the warrant is issued, but which may move outside the district prior to the search;

c. Located within or outside the district in terrorism cases if the magistrate has authority in a district in which activities related to terrorism may have occurred;

d. Via tracking device, if the tracking device is installed in the district, even if it continues to function outside the district; and,

e. Located outside the jurisdiction of any district, but within a U.S. territory, possession, commonwealth, or diplomatic mission.²

The proposed amendment to FRCrmP Rule 41 would provide magistrates with new powers to authorize warrants to remotely search and seize or copy electronic media located outside the magistrate’s district.³ Per the proposal, magistrates would be able to exercise this power in two circumstances:

a. When the physical location of the media or information is “concealed through technological means,” or

b. In an investigation of 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5), when the damaged protected computers are located in five or more districts.⁴

II. Legal Implications

The proposed modification to FRCrmP Rule 41 would make policy decisions about important questions of law that are not currently settled and would best be resolved through legislation.

A. The proposed Rule 41 amendment would authorize searches that violate the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

If the physical location of the electronic media to be searched is unknown, the search may not satisfy the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, which requires that the “place to be searched” be particularly described.⁵ In In Re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, the magistrate judge rejected a government application for a warrant to search and copy information from a computer, the location of which was unknown at the time of the application. The court concluded that the application did not satisfy the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment because the application did not describe the place to be searched.⁶ The court also noted that, because the computer’s location and owner were

² Rule 41(b)(1)-(5), Search and Seizure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

³ Supra, fn 1.

⁴ Under 18 U.S.C. 1030(e), the term “damage” means any impairment to the integrity or availability of data or a system, and the term “protected computer” means any computer affecting interstate or foreign communication - including computers located outside the United States.

⁵ “[...] no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause [...] and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

unknown, the search could easily affect multiple innocent parties.\textsuperscript{7} The court’s determination that the application was insufficient on Fourth Amendment grounds was wholly independent of the court’s consideration of whether the current text of Rule 41 allows for warrants that authorize searches of computers in unknown locations.

The proposed FRCrmP Rule 41 modification includes a note that states: “The amendment does not address constitutional questions, such as the specificity of description that the Fourth Amendment may require in a warrant for remotely searching electronic storage media […] leaving application of this and other constitutional standards to ongoing case law development.”\textsuperscript{8} While we appreciate the fact that the Committee does not seek to address such questions in this rulemaking, the proposed modification to Rule 41 nonetheless does have direct bearing on these very questions since it specifically contemplates the issuance of warrants for computers in concealed locations.

\textbf{B. The proposed Rule 41 amendment would authorize extraterritorial searches that circumvent the MLAT process and may violate international law.}

If the physical location of a computer is concealed through technological means, the computer is potentially anywhere in the world. In commentary, the Department of Justice states that the proposed amendment does not purport to authorize courts to issue warrants that authorize the search of electronic media located in foreign countries.\textsuperscript{9} However, given the global nature of both the Internet and anonymizing tools,\textsuperscript{10} in practice the warrants will very likely be used to authorize searches of electronic media located outside the United States.

If the computer from which data is searched or copied is located abroad, then the search takes place abroad. Several cases hold that a seizure occurs when and where data is copied, even if the warrant to remotely search electronic media is issued in the United States, or if the agent reviewing data extracted remotely from electronic media is located in the United States. The Second Circuit, for example, held that the act of copying electronic data constitutes a seizure, even before an agent searches through the extracted data.\textsuperscript{11} Other courts have held that a search or seizure of data occurs where the electronic storage media is located.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{7} Id. “The Government’s application offers nothing but indirect and conclusory assurance that its search technique will avoid infecting innocent computers or devices[...] What if the Target Computer is located in a public library, an Internet café, or a workplace accessible to others? What if the computer is used by family or friends uninvolved in the illegal scheme?”

\textsuperscript{8} Supra, fn 1, at pg. 341.


\textsuperscript{10} As an example, more than 85% of the users of Tor – a popular service that conceals computer location – are located outside the United States. Tor, Tor Metrics: Users, Top-10 countries by directly connecting users, https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html (last accessed Oct. 22, 2014).


Extraterritorial searches today typically take place in coordination with foreign governments under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process. The issue of whether U.S. magistrates may circumvent MLATs and issue warrants to search data stored abroad is still under litigation. Yet the proposed amendment could be interpreted to authorize U.S. law enforcement to unilaterally search media located abroad, so long as the location is unknown at the time of the search. In practice, this will likely result in U.S. law enforcement agencies circumventing the MLAT process far more often than in present circumstances.

Unilateral extraterritorial searches may violate the international obligations of the United States. Established and binding customary international law provides that a state (i.e., a nation) may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state without that state’s consent. As a corollary of this rule, U.S. law enforcement officers may only exercise their functions in the territory of another state with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that state, and in compliance with the laws of both the United States and the other state. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States describes this stricture as “universally recognized.” The proposed changes to FRCrmP Rule 41 could put U.S. law enforcement agencies at risk of violating this binding rule of sovereignty, as well as the principle of comity, when they unilaterally conduct searches of electronic media outside U.S. territory. Computer users abroad would have little or no remedy for an improper search by the U.S. government, including if that search or seizure damages the user’s computer.

C. The proposed Rule 41 amendment would make changes through judicial rulemaking that have thus far occurred through legislation.

The proposed amendment to FRCrmP Rule 41 would authorize magistrates to issue warrants to search property that is located outside of their districts both when the warrant is issued and when the search occurs. Currently, Rule 41 grants magistrates limited authority to issue warrants to search property outside their districts. Only under subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of the Rule do magistrates have authority to issue warrants for property that is not located in the district both at the time when the warrant is issued and when the search is performed. In comments, the Department of Justice has analogized the language of the proposed amendment to Rule 41 to the current language in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of Rule 41.
However, both (b)(3) and (b)(5) have legislative roots not present in the newly proposed amendment to Rule 41.

Subsection (b)(3) of Rule 41 allows magistrates in any district in which terrorism-related activities have occurred to issue warrants for a person or property outside the district during investigations of domestic or international terrorism. This subsection was a Congressional amendment to Rule 41 as part of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.\(^{19}\)

Subsection (b)(5) of Rule 41 was adopted in 2008 by the Judicial Conference as a rulemaking to allow magistrates to issue warrants for searches in areas under U.S. jurisdiction but outside of federal judicial districts, such as U.S. diplomatic or consular missions, located in foreign nations. However, U.S. jurisdiction in the areas listed in subsection (b)(5) was authorized by Congress. The Committee Notes to subsection (b)(5) state: “The rule is intended to authorize a magistrate judge to issue a search warrant in any of the locations for which 18 U.S.C. §7(9) provides jurisdiction.”\(^{20}\) Accordingly, the language of subsection (b)(5) mirrors that of 18 U.S.C. §7(9), which was first codified through the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.\(^{21}\)

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) authorizes multi-district searches of computers.\(^{22}\) However, this too was an explicit grant of authority from Congress, not an instance of judicial rulemaking.

The proposed changes to FRCrmp Rule 41 are not a Congressional amendment, nor do they implement a direct expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction codified in statute. Congress has not authorized extraterritorial or multi-district searches for computers with concealed locations or during investigations under 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5), as the proposed modification to Rule 41 contemplates. The proposed modification attempts to expand magistrates’ Rule 41 authority in a manner that has historically been accomplished by Congressional action. The proposed modification should be handled through Congress rather than judicial rulemaking.

D. The proposed Rule 41 amendment raises new risks of forum shopping.

Authorizing the government to obtain a warrant from any district to search or seize multiple computers located in any district raises a significant risk of forum shopping. The proposed change to Rule 41 would incentivize agents to seek out and reuse districts that were more inclined to approve warrant applications. In practice, this may frequently result in warrants issued in districts remote from the individual whose electronic media is searched or seized, making it prohibitively inconvenient or expensive for the individual to appear in the district to exercise her right to contest the warrant.

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\(^{19}\) Sec. 219, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. Law 107-56, 107th Cong.

\(^{20}\) Title 18, U.S. Code, Appendix, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title VIII, Rule 41, Committee Notes.

\(^{21}\) Id., fn 19, Sec. 804.

\(^{22}\) 18 U.S.C. 2703(a), as modified by Sec. 220 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
III. **Technological Implications**

The proposed modification to Rule 41 would enable the U.S. government to gain authorization from any district in the United States to spread invasive malware – code that may penetrate, search, and copy electronic media without user authorization – to potentially any computer worldwide. This is essentially allows law enforcement to hack computers with few restrictions on where an intrusion can take place and how many devices to which they may gain entry. It is tailored poorly and can reach practically any computing device while it also implicates many types of common and lawful methods of using the Internet. Finally, the act of intrusion into these devices may substantially damage the devices, the data resident on them, or the functions the devices mediate.

A. “Concealed through technological means” is overly broad.

The trigger language in the proposed amendment that the location of a target device be “concealed through technological means” before a warrant can be issued is overly broad, encompassing legitimate Internet use globally, not just within the United States, on devices for which the primary function is unknown to the government.

The Internet and software that interacts with it – email clients, web browsers, apps, etc. – have developed many ways to conceal a user’s location, either intentionally to protect privacy but often as a side effect of accomplishing another goal, such as confidentiality. The intent of this part of the rule amendment seems to be to allow agents of law enforcement to de-anonymize users of online anonymity tools, such as the Tor network. However, there is a much larger ecosystem of similar technologies that encompass technical methods that effectively re-route traffic over the Internet. Close to half of all U.S. businesses use Virtual Private Network (VPN) technologies or other forms of secure proxies.\(^\text{23}\) VPNs and secure proxies seek to ensure that a user can interact with sensitive data – e.g., trade secrets, medical data, financial data – even when they are forced to use potentially hostile local networking environments, such as the unencrypted free wireless Internet access offered at hotels, airports, and coffee shops. These technologies establish an fully encrypted secure connection with a trusted server on the Internet, and that trusted server “proxies” their network activity – meaning it appears as if all network traffic comes from the proxy server instead of the user’s real network location.

There exist additionally a set of techniques that are designed to misreport identifiers that may associate a user’s identity with their activity online. For example, to protect the privacy of the hundreds of millions of users of Apple’s iOS mobile operating system from forms of in-store retail tracking that can follow shoppers from store to store, Apple has begun randomizing a common network identifier – the MAC address.\(^\text{24}\) This will have the effect of “concealing through technical means” the network location of a device. Finally, the proposed amendment


seems to reach somewhat trivial forms of location obfuscation that are not technically technical but could be construed as such. For example, if a user of a social network service such as Facebook misreports the city in which they live, or if a user of a web browser modifies how the browser reports their native language, these seem to qualify as “concealing through technical means” the user’s location. Legitimate uses of technology that have the effect of “concealing through technological means” a user’s location, e.g., using a VPN or Apple’s iOS mobile operating system, should not trigger the ability for a judge to issue a Rule 41 warrant.

The pervasive nature of technical means that have the purpose or effect of concealing the user’s location is indicative that concealment does not necessarily indicate a crime. In fact, the core technology this rule amendment seeks to reach, the Tor network and Tor Browser software, was developed primarily for two purposes that are fundamentally legitimate: the need of law enforcement as well as military and civilian intelligence agencies to access information services in hostile environments and the need of dissidents in repressive regimes to communicate with the larger, outside world. Additionally, users that may be concerned about their privacy or security given threats online or to their person also use proxy technologies that securely obfuscate their location; this can encompass stalking victims and public servants that face threats of physical harm. Employees of businesses that deal in sensitive data such as finance or medicine may be required to use these kinds of technologies within the scope of their employment; for example, some businesses require their employees to route all traffic through a proxy that can detect viruses or malware, examine traffic for attempts to exfiltrate valuable intellectual property, or even a “caching proxy” that seeks to ease the load on a network by storing commonly retrieved resources such as images, videos, or other large files. Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility that an attempt to conceal location could actually be a simple misconfiguration or other error such that details like a computer’s Internet Protocol (IP) address may be misreported.

Of course, technically, a device that uses any of the techniques mentioned above can be anywhere in the world, and the context of the device’s true function (or contents) will in general be uncertain. As we outline above in Section II.B, this legally extends U.S. law enforcement jurisdiction globally. To the extent U.S. law enforcement uses this rule to hack into devices around the world, we should not be surprised when law enforcement entities from other nations conclude they should have this ability as well. Outside the question of the compatibility of legal regimes that are best dealt with in formal MLAT processes, there are serious questions about the uncertain functional context of a target device. That is, if the location of a device is unknown, concealed, or uncertain, we should expect that the purpose of the device will also be equally if not more uncertain. Law enforcement will have little data from which to ascertain how careful they need be while executing the search and seizure, lest they irreversibly damage the device, connected devices, or critical functionality the device may mediate. Unlike in the physical world, where the implications of an intrusion into a premises are relatively certain and easy to understand, the consequences in cyberspace can be very difficult to estimate. By way of analogy, in the physical world, agents of law enforcement can be reasonably confident that breaking and entering into premises won’t cause the entire building to fall down. Similarly, they can also be reasonably confident that such an intrusion won’t also cause the collapse of a

\[25\] See, e.g., “Who uses Tor?” available at: https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en.
series of nearby buildings or, for that matter, that a building they thought was a typical family home isn’t actually the control system for a nuclear power plant. In cyberspace we cannot be so confident.


The proposed changes to Rule 41 would allow the government to obtain a warrant in any district to remotely search five or more “damaged” computers during investigations of 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5). The justification for this proposal has been discussed in context of law enforcement action against botnets – networks of private computers infected with malware that enables an unauthorized party to use or control all or parts of the infected computers remotely. As the FBI notes, millions of infected computers can be part of a botnet. However, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5) does not only encompass botnets.

18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5) prohibits causing “damage” to protected computers intentionally without authorization or recklessly. “Damage” is defined broadly under the statute to include any malware, virus, Trojan, or even benign code that impairs “the integrity or availability of data.” While botnets may involve using infected computers to commit additional crimes (such as distributed denial-of-service attacks), computers infected with viruses are not necessarily committing any subsequent crime – though the act of damaging the computer by infecting it with a virus is a crime under 1030(a)(5).

Because the proposed modification to Rule 41 would apply to investigations into any violation of 1030(a)(5), not just botnets, the proposed modification would enable the government to more easily remotely search computers infected with any virus or other damaging code. Approximately 30 percent of all computers worldwide, as well as in the United States, are estimated to be infected with some type of malware. The number of computers that may therefore be subject to multidistrict searches under the proposed Rule 41 amendment is massive.

C. Data stored on devices is increasingly sensitive and intrusion may damage the device, its data, and/or dependent systems.

The language of the proposed amendment that allows law enforcement to “use remote access to search electronic storage media to seize or copy electronically stored information” will allow access to data of an exceedingly sensitive nature in many cases.

While the particularity of a warrant under the 4th Amendment requires the government to specify exactly the materials they seek to search for and seize, the proposed amendment would grant access to a panoply of sensors on modern computing platforms. Desktop

26 Supra, fn 9, pg. 172.
28 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(8).
computers, laptop computers, tablet computers and mobile computing devices contain an increasing array of sensors capable of reading current environmental and personal data – for example, microphones, cameras, motion sensors, and more complex accessories such as fitness tracking devices that measure fine-grained body data. Using these sensors, these devices store a multitude of sensitive data over time – personal photographs and videos, financial data, medical records, educational materials. As the Supreme Court recognized recently, networked devices like smartphones increasingly hold “a digital record of nearly every aspect of [our] lives – from the mundane to the intimate.”\(^3\) As mentioned above, the target device can be potentially any device attached to the Internet from personal computing devices to industrial control systems to Internet voting systems. Allowing law enforcement a broad remit to remotely access such sensitive information systems will have grave consequences for personal privacy and liberty, as well as the integrity of critical systems.

The acts of intrusion onto a device and/or seizing data may result in impairment of the device or data resident on the device. Intrusion methods necessarily exploit weakness in the defenses of a device to gain access. Practically speaking, “network investigative techniques” employ flaws or bugs in software like web browsers such that law enforcement can gain access to the larger system. Vulnerabilities or flaws in a system are by definition features the designers of the system did not plan the system’s functionality to take into account. “Network investigative techniques” used by law enforcement can vary from relatively simple Computer and Protocol Address Verifier (CIPAV) tools that seek to assess and report network identifiers and information back to law enforcement agents to deeper forms of persistent access where invasive methods like rootkits – i.e., programs designed to completely evade system defenses and be highly resistant to removal – which can potentially permanently damage a device.

Further, it is unclear from the text of the proposed amendment and relevant jurisprudence if the extent of “seizing” data does not merely copy the data but may also render it unusable by the user. If seizing and copying are distinct in this manner, a seizure of data could potentially deprive the user of critical data or system functionality without due process before a finding of guilt has been made.

The act of intrusion and installing a “network investigative technique” can not only harm the device but also potentially result in further follow-on damage due to vulnerabilities introduced into the system or exacerbated by the technical act of gaining entry. To the extent the intrusion technique causes damage or triggers malware that causes ancillary damage, the device itself may be no longer functional, along with any data it holds and any actions in the real world it performs. There are examples of adversarial network investigation that resulted in taking an entire country off the Internet\(^3\) as well as buggy law enforcement intrusion code that left targeted devices seriously vulnerable to subsequent malicious attacks.\(^3\)

\(^3\) Riley v. California, 573 U. S. ____ (2014) at 19.


D. Concealment of the location of “information” can potentially reach even more devices.

The proposed amendment does not just trigger on concealing the location of a device with technical means but also concealment of the location of information. Similarly to the discussion above in Section III.A of the variety of activities that by their nature obscure the location of a device, there are a number of modern computing techniques that obscure the location of information, mostly for efficiency gains related to data mining and analysis.

For example, rather than keeping very large databases of information in a single location, many modern computing techniques rely on a technique called “sharding,” or the process of breaking up individual pieces of a database and redistributing them across disparate computing facilities. If a target machine has information sharded across tens or hundreds of additional machines, the proposed amendment would appear to reach all of those devices as well. There are more exotic types of data structures— for example, hash tables and bloom filters— that do similar things from the perspective of technically concealing the location of information; some of these techniques are very difficult— by design— to map onto a physical location or the specific device on which the data may be stored.

IV. Practical implications

In addition to the legal and technical implications, we are concerned that a slew of negative practical implications may be relevant once law enforcement gains the abilities contemplated by the proposed rule.

First, the rule essentially eliminates existing practical limits on law enforcement search and seizure in networked computing. The Department of Justice indicated that under the current Rule 41, agents seeking authority to search computers in multiple districts must obtain warrants with magistrates in every district in which the computers are known to be located (except in cases of domestic or international terrorism).33 As a practical matter, agents currently must be judicious in deciding which computers to remotely search. However, if the requirement to obtain warrants from each district in which the property is known to be located were removed, the likely effect would be for far more remote searches of far more machines. As we argue above, the number of computers for which location is concealed, or which are “damaged” may well run to many millions. The potential for abuse or overzealous and sloppy law enforcement hacking is very real.

Further, there are follow-on implications from this collapsing of practical limitations. Authorizing law enforcement to operate in this manner may lead to more intrusive methods being brought to bear. If malware that reveals computer location is easily bypassed or rendered ineffective, law enforcement may have to use more powerful techniques that are more likely to threaten the integrity of the target device or information. For example, a simple web beacon that can report a device’s IP address back to law enforcement can be blocked by common software (e.g., Little Snitch) that prohibits network requests to unknown addresses. The government

33 Supra, fn 9, pg. 173.
may then attempt more intrusive – necessarily less reasonable – searches of the contents of media to gather clues regarding location.

Finally, the proposed rule amendment and the law enforcement hacking that may result has the potential to spark a deadly arms race. Malicious hackers may begin to purposefully stage attacks from computers running critical infrastructure and applications. If an intrusion renders these devices inoperable – either by design or accident – the implications for just one such incident could be profound for society. We may very well see staging of malware on critical infrastructure coupled with “trip wires” that are armed to cause damage and havoc when an attempted intrusion is detected.

V. **This is an issue for Congress**

Law enforcement clearly faces challenges in remotely searching electronic media in concealed locations. However, the proposed rule has important technical, legal, and practical implications that necessitate the deliberation of Congress. We recommend that the Judicial Conference reject the proposed changes to Rule 41 and instead urge Congress to address the issue of remote searches of electronic media located in multiple districts or in unknown locations.

END
TAB 4
Testimony and Statement for the Record of

Alan Butler
Senior Counsel
Electronic Privacy Information Center

on

Proposed Amendments to Rule 41
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

before the

Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules

November 5, 2014
Judge Raggi, Members of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on the proposed amendments. My name is Alan Butler and I am Senior Counsel at the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”).

EPIC is a non-partisan research organization in Washington, D.C., established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging privacy and civil liberties issues. We work with a distinguished panel of advisors in the fields of law, technology, and public policy. EPIC has previously filed amicus briefs in cases concerning the core procedural protections granted under the Fourth Amendment: notice and the opportunity to challenge the scope of a government search. For example, in 2002 EPIC filed a brief in United States v. Bach, arguing that the Fourth Amendment requires officer presence during the execution of a warrant and that it was therefore unlawful to serve a warrant on an Internet Service Provider via facsimile.

EPIC has a particular interest in ensuring that Fourth Amendment privacy rights are not eroded by the use of emerging surveillance technologies. As Justice O’Connor famously addressed in Arizona v. Evans, “[w]ith the benefits of more efficient law enforcement mechanisms comes the burden of corresponding constitutional responsibilities.” In an effort to maintain these constitutional responsibilities, EPIC routinely participates as amicus curiae in major Supreme Court cases addressing Fourth Amendment rights in the context of emerging technologies.

For example, in 2011 EPIC, joined by thirty legal scholars and technical experts, filed a brief in United States v. Jones, arguing that the use of invasive GPS tracking systems is a search requiring a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. The Court ultimately found that the warrantless installation and use of a GPS device to track an individual over 30 days violated the Fourth Amendment. In 2012, EPIC, joined by thirty-two legal scholars and technical experts, as well as eight transparency organizations, filed a brief in Clapper v. Amnesty International, USA, arguing that the NSA’s Signals Intelligence capabilities have expanded to the point where it would be reasonable for United States persons to assume that all of their communications sent abroad are being routinely collected.

In 2013, EPIC, joined by twenty-four legal scholars and technical experts, filed a brief in Riley v. California, arguing that modern cell phones provide access to a wealth of sensitive

1 About EPIC, EPIC, https://epic.org/epic/about.html.
3 See Brief of Amicus Curiae EPIC in Support of Appellee, United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1238).
4 514 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1995); see also EPIC, Sandra Day O’Connor’s Legacy, https://epic.org/privacy/justices/oconnor/.
6 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
personal data and that phones should not be subject to warrantless searches incident to arrest.\textsuperscript{8} In \textit{Riley}, the Court unanimously held that officers may not search the contents of a cell phone without a warrant, even where that phone is seized during a lawful arrest.\textsuperscript{9} The Court in \textit{Riley} addressed the importance of the procedural protections established by the Fourth Amendment. Rejecting the government’s argument that law enforcement protocols would suffice to limit access to certain sensitive information, the Court emphasized that “the Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the right to government agency protocols.”\textsuperscript{10} The Court also found that cell phone searches could be particularly invasive because they would allow the inspection of remotely stored files.\textsuperscript{11}

We appreciate the Committee’s important work in maintaining the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In my statement today, I will: (1) describe the history of two key Fourth Amendment requirements relevant to Rule 41: notice and officer presence upon execution of a warrant; (2) discuss the history of and limitations on “covert entry” warrants; and (3) recommend that the proposed amendment not be adopted because it would authorize unreasonable law enforcement practices and inhibit the development of Fourth Amendment standards for remote access searches.

I. It is Well Established That Notice, Officer Presence, and Other Formalities Are Key to Fourth Amendment Reasonableness

The Fourth Amendment was adopted to ensure that there were procedural safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority, “securing to the American people, among other things, those safeguards which had grown up in England to protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”\textsuperscript{12} The Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Weeks v. United States} heralded the dawning of the age of constitutional criminal procedure, in which the Court established the exclusionary rule, prohibiting introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and identified the core practices and formalities that now circumscribe lawful searches. The exclusionary rule was essential to the protection of Fourth Amendment rights because introduction of unlawfully obtained evidence at trial would “affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action.”\textsuperscript{13}

The Court in \textit{Weeks} recognized that prohibiting the government’s use of improperly obtained evidence was necessary to ensure that the formalities and procedural safeguards required by the Fourth Amendment were followed. “The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority. . . .”\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{8} See Brief of \textit{Amicus Curiae} EPIC and Twenty-four Technical Experts and Legal Scholars in Support of Petitioner, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 13-132).
\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Riley}, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.
\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Id.} at 2491.
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Id.} (citing Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center in No. 13-132, at 12-14, 20).
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Weeks v. United States}, 232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914).
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Id.} at 394.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Id.} at 393.
well-established procedures would lead to “gradual depreciation of the rights secured by [the Fourth Amendment] by imperceptible practice of courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers.”

Even where an officer conducts a search pursuant to an authorized warrant, the Fourth Amendment requires that certain procedural formalities be followed to protect against abuse. Since the 1700s, United States law has required an officer’s presence during the service of a search warrant. An officer’s presence discourages government abuse of power and unwarranted intrusion upon privacy by ensuring guarantees of trustworthiness and accountability. The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of strict adherence to procedural safeguards in the execution of search warrants, because “[i]t may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.” Therefore, “[i]t is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachment thereon.”

But officer presence alone is not sufficient to make the service of a warrant reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; the method of entry into the place to be searched is also an important consideration. As the Supreme Court stated, “we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.” In fact, the Court has held that notice provided in advance of a search is an important element of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.

In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Court found that advanced notice was a clearly established requirement of a reasonable search based on the common law history and practice. The Court also found that its own cases supported the principle of prior notice as being “embedded in Anglo-American law.” The Court unanimously held that the “common-law ‘knock and announce’ principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment,” specifically stating that “an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”

Notice, officer presence, and other formalities are necessary to guarantee accountability and trustworthiness in the exercise of police power. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “[t]he value judgment that [has historically] motivated a united democratic people fighting to defend those very freedoms from totalitarian attack is unchanged.” Procedural formalities are

16 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886) (detailing the history of search and seizure law and procedure).
18 Id.
20 Id. at 931.
21 Id. at 934 (quoting Miller v. U.S. 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958)).
22 Id. at 929, 934.
critical in preserving our privacy in order to maintain cherished values of humanity and civil liberty. In *McVeigh v. Cohen*, which addressed unauthorized access to electronic communications, the court stated:

> In these days of “big brother,” where through technology and otherwise the privacy interests of individuals from all walks of life are being ignored or marginalized, it is imperative that statutes explicitly protecting these rights be strictly observed.²⁴

Fundamental principles “established by years of endeavor and suffering” cannot be sacrificed to the needs or convenience of law enforcement.”²⁵ Notice and officer presence are key elements of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and courts should only allow deviation from these requirements with caution and under very strict and limited conditions.

II. **Courts Have Only Allowed Delayed Notice and Permitted Covert Entry Warrants in Limited Circumstances**

In certain limited circumstances, courts have held that law enforcement officers may execute search warrants through covert means and without prior notice to the subject.²⁶ The authority to conduct “surreptitious searches and seizures”²⁷ has been limited to cases where (1) delayed notice and covert entry is necessary, and (2) notice will be provided within a reasonable time after the search.²⁸ This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that notice is an element of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.²⁹

The judicial authorization of surreptitious searches, initiated without prior notice to or confrontation of the subject, is a relatively new development in the history of Fourth Amendment law. Covert entry warrants were not contemplated during the founding era, and no published opinions in the United States addressed them until 1985. In *United States v. Frietas*, the Ninth Circuit found the Fourth Amendment requires that “surreptitious entries be closely circumscribed.”³⁰ Drawing on the limitations on wiretapping outlined in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, the court in *Frietas* found that both “the necessity for the surreptitious seizure and the subsequent notice” were an important element of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.³¹

The Ninth Circuit in *Frietas* noted that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all surreptitious entries, as the Supreme Court’s held in *Dalia v. United States*,³² but that “absence of

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²⁵ *Weeks*, 232 U.S. at 393.
²⁷ Also referred to as “sneak and peek” or “sneak and steal” warrants.
²⁸ See United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990).
³⁰ *United States v. Frietas*, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1985).
³¹ *Id.*
any notice requirement in the warrant casts strong doubt on its constitutional adequacy.” The Court in *Dalia* rejected a defendant’s argument that officers’ covert entry into his office to install “bugging equipment” violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court found that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit *per se* a covert entry performed for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment.” However, in its finding that the surreptitious entry was constitutional, the Court relied upon the lower court finding that the “safest and most successful method of accomplishing the installation of the wiretapping device was through breaking and entering [the office].” The Court also found that delayed notice equivalent to that provided under Title III would be a “constitutionally adequate substitute for advance notice” in the case of a covert entry warrant.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit later addressed the validity of surreptitious search warrants in a series of cases beginning in 1990. In *United States v. Villegas*, the Second Circuit considered a defendant’s challenge to a surreptitious search of his farmhouse, executed pursuant to a warrant but without notice until his arrest two months later. The court found that “certain safeguards are required where the entry is to be covert,” but concluded “appropriate conditions were imposed” in that case. Specifically, the court found that “two limitations on the issuance of warrants for covert-entry searches for intangibles are appropriate.” The first requirement is that officers show a “reasonable necessity” for not providing advance notice of the search. The second requirement is that delayed notice must be given “within a reasonable time after the covert entry.” The court agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s finding in *Frietas* that “as an initial matter, the issuing court should not authorize a notice delay of longer than seven days,” but may grant extensions thereafter based on a “fresh showing of the need for further delay.” Subsequent lower court decisions, addressing covert entry warrants, have failed to recognize that notice is an important element of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, as the Supreme Court found in *Wilson v. Arkansas*.

Congress later authorized the issuance of delayed notice warrants in Section 213 of the USA PATRIOT Act, but only in certain circumstances. The law includes three express limitations on the issuance of delayed notice warrants, similar to those imposed by the Ninth Circuit in *Frietas* and the Second Circuit in *Villegas*: first, the issuing court must find “reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have an adverse result,” second, the warrant must prohibit the seizure of tangible property and electronic files, “except where the court finds reasonable necessity for the seizure,”

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33 *Frietas*, 800 F.2d 1456.  
34 *Dalia*, 441 U.S. at 241-42.  
35 *Id.* at 248.  
36 *Id.* at 248 n.8.  
37 *Id.* at 248.  
38 899 F.2d 1324, 1336 (2d Cir. 1990).  
39 *Id.*  
40 *Id.* at 1337.  
41 *Id.*  
42 *Id.*  
43 *Id.*  
44 See Witmer-Rich, *supra*, at 524 n.86.  
and finally, the warrant must provide for notice within a “reasonable period not to exceed 30
days.”\[^{46}\] Prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act, some courts had held that the failure to provide
notice is not \textit{per se} unconstitutional,\[^{47}\] but these decisions do not fully address the fact that notice
is a core element of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, as the Court found in \textit{Wilson}.

Existing precedents do not support the conclusion that surreptitious warrants may be
issued without first establishing that delayed notice is necessary and providing for future notice
within a reasonable period of time.

III. The Proposed Amendment to Rule 41 Would Depart from Established Precedent
and Inhibit the Future Fourth Amendment Development

Because it would authorize the issuance of digital surreptitious search warrants without
requiring a showing that such methods are necessary or that notice be given within a reasonable
amount of time after the search, the proposed amendment to Rule 41 would be inconsistent with
well-established Fourth Amendment precedents.

The rule would grant magistrates the authority to “issue a warrant to use remote access to
search electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored information” if either
(1) “the district where the media or information is located has been concealed through
technological means” or (2) “in an investigation of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), the
media are protected computers that have been damaged without authorization and are located in
five or more districts.”

An officer applying for a remote access warrant under the proposed revision of Rule 41
would not have to make any showing that the delay in notifying the target of the search is
reasonably “necessary” for the investigation. Rather, the Rule would authorize issuance of a
surreptitious search warrant in any case where the target of the search has used an online proxy
tool. There may be some cases where a court would find it is reasonably necessary to use remote
access tools, but that will not be the case in every instance where the target is using a proxy
service. Without a requirement that the requesting officer establish necessity as required for all
other covert search warrants, the proposed rule will be overbroad.

Furthermore, the proposed amendment to Rule 41(f)(1) would not require an officer to
provide notice within a reasonable time. Instead, the rule would require that the officer “make
reasonable efforts” to serve a copy of the warrant. That is certainly necessary, but it is not
sufficient, as the Court established in \textit{Wilson} and circuit courts recognized in \textit{Frietas} and
\textit{Villegas}. Even the delayed notice provision in the Patriot Act, which has been widely criticized
for being overbroad, provides for notice within a “reasonable period not to exceed 30 days,” with
a requirement that any further extensions be independently justified.

\[^{46}\] 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b).
\[^{47}\] \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 402-03 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Pangburn,
983 F.2d 440, 455 (2d Cir. 1993).
As drafted, the amended Rule 41 would authorize the issuance of overly broad covert search warrants and would not require sufficiently prompt notice to satisfy Fourth Amendment scrutiny.48

The proposed amendments to Rule 41 would not only be constitutionally defective, they would also inhibit development of Fourth Amendment law in the area of remote electronic searches. Fourth Amendment law develops primarily through suppression motions filed by defendants in response to the use of new law enforcement techniques.49 However, this process breaks down where the exclusionary rule is not available as a remedy to the defendants who might seek to challenge a new investigative technique.50 The exclusionary rule is not an available remedy when the officer relied in good faith upon a warrant issued by a magistrate, even when that warrant is later deemed invalid.51

It would therefore be improper to grant new warrant authority by amending Rule 41 without first establishing that proposed rule is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Future defendants who are subject to a search authorized under the amended rule would have no available remedy, and therefore no incentive to challenge potentially unconstitutional intrusions into their computer networks. In that case, the amendment itself would resolve the constitutional question before it is properly presented in an individual case.

Conclusion

The proposed amendments to Rule 41 would authorize searches beyond the scope permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the rule would allow for surreptitious searches without the required showing of necessity, and the resulting warrants would not include the requirement that notice be served within a reasonable time after the search. For these reasons, the Committee should not adopt the proposed amendments as drafted.

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing. I will be pleased to answer your questions.

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48 For example, the Seattle Times recently reported that the FBI used a link to a fake version of the newspaper’s website to remotely install surveillance software on a suspect’s computer. Mike Carter, FBI Created Fake Seattle Times Web Page to Nab Bomb-threat Suspect, (Oct. 27, 2014), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2024888170_fbinnesspaper1xml.html. The FBI special agent in charge was quoted as saying the FBI only uses remote access techniques “when there is sufficient reason to believe it could be successful in resolving a threat.” Id.


50 Id. at 1092-95.

Testimony of Amie Stepanovich
Senior Policy Counsel, Access
on behalf of
Access and the Electronic Frontier Foundation
Before the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
on the Matter of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41

I would like to thank the members of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States for allowing me to testify in front of you today. My name is Amie Stepanovich and I am Senior Policy Counsel with Access, an international digital rights non-governmental organization.¹ Founded in the wake of the 2009 Iranian post-election crackdown, Access seeks to defend and extend the digital rights of users around the world.² Today I am also testifying on behalf of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.³ The Electronic Frontier Foundation, or EFF, was founded in 1990 and champions user privacy, free expression, and innovation through impact litigation, policy analysis, grassroots activism, and technology development.⁴

Introduction

My testimony today will focus on the second proposed change to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.⁵ Specifically, the proposed change I would like to discuss grants magistrate judges authority to issue warrants within an investigation under the Computer Fraud

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⁴ About EFF, Electronic Frontier Foundation, https://www.eff.org/about (last visited Oct. 29, 2014). EFF Staff Attorney Hanni Fakhoury, Senior Staff Technologist Seth Schoen, Senior Staff Attorney Jennifer Lynch, and Senior Staff Attorney Lee Tien contributed to this testimony.
and Abuse Act to remotely search protected computers that have been damaged without authorization and to seize or copy electronically stored information on those computers when the computers are located in five or more districts and are not otherwise within that magistrate’s jurisdiction.\(^6\) As discussed in the relevant Committee Note, this change specifically involves the creation and control of “botnets.”\(^7\) Today, I will provide to the committee some technical background on botnets, the unique natures of botnets that would cause the rule change to have an overbroad, substantive impact on computing, and how the Department of Justice’s interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,\(^8\) or CFAA, could compound these impacts. I will end discussing how the proposed change could cause more harm than good in practice. Instead, we propose that a statutory solution is pursued to address the special challenges of unlawful botnets.

**What are botnets?**

The term “botnet” is short for “robot network.” A botnet is a network of computers that have been linked together.\(^9\) Botnets can consist of anywhere from a few computers to several million, as was the case with the Mariposa botnet, which was shut down in 2009,\(^10\) as well as the most infamous botnet, the Conficker, first discovered in 2008.\(^11\) Unlawful botnets are created when computers are infected with malicious code, known as malware.\(^12\) The type of malware that creates a botnet allows the infected computer to be remotely access and controlled by a

\(^6\) Id.

\(^7\) Id.


third party, often without the owner’s knowledge.\footnote{Bots and Botnets--A Growing Threat, Norton by Symantec, http://us.norton.com/botnet/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2014).} The infected computers in a botnet are sometimes known as “zombies.”\footnote{Id.}

Botnet malware may sit stagnant on an infected computer for months or years without causing any additional harm to the computer itself or any other system, and without coming to the attention of the computer’s owner or operator. Some botnets may never actually be utilized and may be patched without incident. In the case of Conficker, the botnet went largely unused despite its massive size, resiliency, and duration.\footnote{One version of the botnet was eventually utilized to download and install additional malware. Conficker, Wikipedia.org, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conficker#End_action (last visited Oct. 29, 2014).}

Not all networked computers are intended for malicious or unlawful purposes. Lawful systems that closely resemble botnets in structure also exist and are used for communication and coordination.\footnote{About Eggdrop, Eggsheads Development Team (Oct. 2, 2011), http://cvs.eggheads.org/viewvc/eggdrop1.6/doc/ABOUT?view=markup. Additionally, other lawful computer networks are encompassed under the terms of the proposed rule, namely systems of protected computers located in five or more districts. Examples are CDNs, P2P systems, and websites run on shared resources.} In business contexts, these systems may be used to create a cloud computing system, to capitalize on spare computing resources, to balance application loads, and for testing purposes.\footnote{Build you own botnet with open source software, WIRED, http://howto.wired.com/wiki/Build_your_own_botnet_with_open_source_software#Business_Usages (last visited Oct. 29, 2014).} They may also be created and used to harness processing power in order to conduct scientific experiments or monitor emerging weather patterns.\footnote{ATLAS@Home, CERN, http://atlasathome.cern.ch/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2014); Katherine Smyrk & Liz Minchin, How your computer could reveal what’s driving record rain and heat in Australia and NZ, The Conversation (March 25, 2014, 11:24 EDT), http://theconversation.com/how-your-computer-could-reveal-whats-driving-record-rain-and-heat-in-australia-and-nz-24804.}

\textbf{Substantive impacts of the proposed Rule 41 amendment}

On account of their distributed nature, investigations of unlawful botnets undoubtedly pose a significant barrier to law enforcement. Access and EFF empathize with these challenges and are willing to work with members of Congress and leaders in law enforcement to develop an
appropriate and rights-respective response. However, due to the same considerations, the proposed rule change presented today as a procedural modification would have a significant substantive impact, including on rights otherwise guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment and international law. Accordingly, we urge the rejection of the proposed amendment to Rule 41 in favor of pursuit of a statutory solution promulgated democratically in an open, public, and accountable legislative process.

The CFAA, initially passed in 1986, has traditionally been used to prosecute the theft of private data or damage to systems by way of malicious hacking. The CFAA was designed to provide justice for victims of these activities by offering a remedy against the perpetrators - the plain text of the relevant section of the CFAA clearly focuses on knowing or intentional malicious activity. Using this authority, magistrate judges issue warrants against those who create and use unlawful botnets, controlling the infected computers of otherwise innocent users. However, the proposed amendment unilaterally expands these investigations to further encompass the devices of the victims themselves - those who have already suffered injury and are most at risk by the further utilization of the botnet. And, as noted, a single botnet can include millions (or tens of millions) of victim’s computers, which may be located not only across the United States, but anywhere around the world.

Victims of botnets include journalists, dissidents, whistleblowers, members of the military, lawmakers and world leaders, or protected classes. Each of these users, and any other user subject to search or seizure under the proposed amendment, has inherent rights and

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19 See, e.g., United States v. Norris, 928 F.2d 504, (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012).
20 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) for “knowingly” and “intentionally” language.
22 Supra note 5. The proposed amendment would permit law enforcement to “... use remote access to search electronic storage media [when] the media are protected computers...”
23 Notably, the provision in the CFAA relevant to the rule change addresses harm to a single computer - each provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) addresses access to a “protected computer” - that is, one single computer, or, perhaps in some circumstances, a small network of computers operated by a single entity. A “protected computer” has been, at its most expansive, a corporate or government computer network.
protections under the U.S. Constitution, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and/or other well-accepted international law.\textsuperscript{24} Without reference to or regard for these rights and protections, the proposed change would subject any number of these users to state access to their personal data on the ruling of any district magistrate. This is a substantive expansion of the CFAA. Today we are in the midst of a national, not to mention global, conversation about the appropriate scope of government surveillance. The U.S. Congress is actively considering a number of proposals to reform both international and domestic surveillance activities.\textsuperscript{25} The proposed amendment is an end run around this process.

Further complicating matters, the proposed change being considered here today will likely have ramifications for a large number of users who are not even a part of a botnet. These users may be tangentially connected to a botnet through any number of means, such as the use of a common shared server or service provider. For example, earlier this year Microsoft applied to a federal judge for a court order to assist in dismantling a pair of botnets that encompassed a total of about 18,000 computers.\textsuperscript{26} The resulting action led to the disruption of service for nearly 5,000,000 legitimate websites or devices on which 1,800,000 additional non-targeted users


\textsuperscript{26} The court order applied to 18,000 subdomains. Many of these were likely individual personal computers, though it is possible that a small percentage were actually not individual computers. Microsoft Corp. v. Mutairi et al., No. 14-cv-0987, (D. Nev. June 19, 2014) (Brief in support of App. for TRO), available at http://www.noticeoflawsuit.com/docs/Brief%20in%20Support%20of%20Ex%20Parte%20Application%20for%20TRO.pdf?page=9. For clarity, we will refer to each subdomain as an individual computer.
were engaging in legitimate, constitutionally protected speech.\textsuperscript{27} These other users had no connection to the botnets nor were they known to have broken any law, and instead were only guilty of using the same service as the botnet operators, a fact that caused a public outcry among the public and civil society.\textsuperscript{28}

While the Microsoft case was a civil action, and not pursued in a criminal context, it is a good example of the unsettled legal nature of these issues and the difficulty in crafting narrowly-tailored and appropriate remedies. This potential for far-flung damage requires a careful balancing of rights and responsibilities that is best accomplished through the public legislative process.

**Overbroad application of the CFAA**

The above problems are exacerbated by overbroad interpretations of the CFAA itself. Federal prosecutors have forcibly expanded the scope of the CFAA through the overuse of the “without authorization” prong to encompass a range of unanticipated, and patently inappropriate, activities: users have been charged with violating the CFAA for violating online terms of service, researching website vulnerabilities, and lying on social media profiles.\textsuperscript{29}

Aaron’s Law - so named for technologist Aaron Swartz who was aggressively prosecuted under the CFAA eventually leading to his suicide - has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Zoe Lofgren with six co-sponsors to restrict these overuses.\textsuperscript{30} However, until either Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court are able to permanently


rectify these mis-applications of the CFAA, there is a danger that the proposed amendment could be used in a shocking number of unintended instances. This is particularly concerning because, as explained above, there are several properly-established and otherwise lawful computer networks that the proposed rule would likely encompass. Increasing the potential impact of the proposed amendment, any small networked group of computers may be subject to invasive surveillance at the whim of an overzealous prosecutor and a compliant judge. Further, as also explained above, since the proposed amendment targets victim computers and not the devices of bad actors, it would be enough for a computer connected to a lawful network to carry a virus or to have violated a standard shrinkwrap agreement to justify this surveillance, a move that carries heavy implications for constitutional rights and rights under international law.

**The proposed amendment in practice**

I have described how the proposal could bring an enormous number of computers belonging to innocent users into the purview of the CFAA and subject them to law enforcement surveillance. In applying the proposed amendment, it is likely that law enforcement could cause more harm to these users than the botnet it has seeks to investigate. Specifically, the use of the word “seizure” in the proposal, an undefined term, could authorize any amount of invasive activity. For example, as in the Microsoft case described above, law enforcement could intercept and re-route legitimate internet traffic. Further, the ambiguity in the language could potentially be interpreted to encompass a level of government hacking into private networks. Even groups that are supportive of this type of government activity concede that it necessarily requires statutory authorization.³¹

The range of offensive cybersecurity measures available to law enforcement vary from passive measures like beaconing - causing files to broadcast back to a preordained location - to

³¹ The IP Commission Report, 82, (May 2013), available at http://ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_052213.pdf “Statutes should be formulated that protect companies seeking to deter entry into their networks and prevent exploitation of their own network information while properly empowered law-enforcement authorities are mobilized in a timely way against attackers.”
active and potentially harmful measures that interfere with the operation of the computer or its communications with other devices. The proper limits for use of offensive measures should be subject to public debate. While limits have been raised through various statutory vehicles in recent years, none have gained significant public support, and one has received not one, but two veto threats from the White House. It is not the place to pre-empt these continued conversations through implementation of a procedural measure.

**Conclusion**

The proposed amendment before the Committee today is a substantive change to federal law masquerading as a procedural measure. Once again, I urge you to reject the proposal and to, instead, support the exploration of appropriate statutory solutions for any legal gaps in the investigation, pursuit, and prosecution of those responsible for unlawful botnets. Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

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TAB  6
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. ANELLO BEFORE THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES
Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building
One Columbus Circle, N.E., Washington, D.C.
November 5, 2014

Good morning. My thanks to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules for the invitation to testify today. I am the president of the Federal Bar Council, an organization of lawyers who practice in federal courts within the Second Circuit\(^1\). The Council was founded in 1932, and currently has approximately 3,800 members. It is dedicated to promoting excellence in federal practice and fellowship among federal practitioners. The Council, together with its several committees, regularly comments on proposed changes to the various rules that affect the practices of our members.

In a letter dated August 27, 2014, the Advisory Committee solicited the views of the Council on several proposed amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 4 and 41. The Council provided its views on the proposed amendments in a letter addressed to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated October 27, 2014.

On behalf of the Council, I would like to commend the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules for its work developing these amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Council supports the proposed amendments to Rules 4 and 41 and recommends that the Advisory Committee submit all of the proposed amendments to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.

**Rule 4**

In its current form, Rule 4 provides that, for service to be effected on a corporation, a copy of the summons must be delivered to an officer, managing or general agent, or to another agent authorized to receive service. A copy also must be mailed to the organization’s last known address within the judicial district, or to its principal place of business elsewhere in the United States.

The mailing requirement poses an undue obstacle to the prosecution of foreign corporations that are suspected of committing offenses in the United States, but that

\(^1\) I am also a principal in Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., a firm that specializes in litigation and, in particular, white collar criminal defense.
cannot be served because they have no last known address or principal place of business here. This has led the Department of Justice to recommend that Rule 4 be amended to remove the mailing requirement, and to designate the means to serve a summons upon an organization located outside the United States.

In response to the DOJ’s recommendation, the Advisory Committee has proposed several amendments to Rule 4. Chief among these are (i) limiting the mailing requirement when delivery is made in the United States, (ii) providing means for service outside the United States, and (iii) specifying that sanctions may be levied against an organizational defendant that fails to appear in response to a summons.

To address the concern that service of process on foreign organizations may not be completed if the organization does not have either (i) an address within the district, or (ii) a principal place of business outside the district, but within the United States, the Advisory Committee has proposed limiting the mailing requirement. Under the proposed amendments, the mailing requirement would apply only to situations where service has been made on a statutorily appointed agent, and the authorizing statute itself requires mailing as well as personal service.

The Advisory Committee also has recommended amending Rule 4 to authorize service on a foreign organization by any “means that gives notice.” The proposed amendment sets out three permissible, non-exhaustive methods of service that presumptively satisfy this requirement.

Finally, the Advisory Committee has proposed amending Rule 4 to address the potential consequences for an organization that fails to appear in response to a summons. Rule 4 currently provides that both individual and corporate defendants may be served with a summons, but the rule is silent on the procedure to be followed if an organizational defendant fails to appear. The proposed amendment would fill this gap, by providing that a judge may take any action authorized by United States law if an organizational defendant fails to appear.

In the view of the Federal Bar Council, the proposed amendments fairly address the gaps in the current version of the rule that may prevent the government from being able to prosecute effectively foreign organizations that commit crimes in the United States but have no physical presence here.

In light of the actual delivery required by the rule, the Council believes that the mailing requirement in Rule 4 is largely redundant and unnecessary, and prevents service on foreign organizations without a physical presence in the United States. The amendments would eliminate this requirement, unless a statutory obligation exists to mail a copy of the summons to the organization.
The Council is also of the view that the various methods of service for foreign organizations described in the amendments are reasonably calculated to provide effective notice, while also ensuring that service complies with United States constitutional requirements, the law of the foreign jurisdiction, and any applicable international agreements.

The Council also agrees with the Advisory Committee’s decision to give the courts discretion to fashion remedies for a corporation’s failure to appear after service, to the extent authorized by United States law. Foreign and domestic corporations have many incentives to appear and resolve criminal charges once service is made. For this reason, cases in which an organizational defendant has defaulted appear to be rare. Nevertheless, to the same extent good reasons exist to permit a court to impose consequences on an individual defendant who fails to appear for a criminal summons, courts should possess such authority as to organizational defendants. The Advisory Committee’s language provides a framework for the courts to evaluate the range of actions authorized by law if and when cases arise in which a corporate defendant fails to appear after being served with a summons.

For these reasons, and for the reasons provided by the Advisory Committee, we recommend that the Advisory Committee submit the proposed amendments to Rule 4 to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.

**Rule 41**

Rule 41 addresses the circumstances under which a court has authority to issue a warrant to search and seize a person or property. With few exceptions, the court’s authority is limited to issuing warrants for search and seizure of person or property located within the district.

The Department of Justice has raised concerns about the rule’s territorial venue restrictions in the context of efforts to search and seize electronic information. In particular, the Department of Justice is concerned that the rule may impede investigations when the location of electronic information sought is unknown, or the electronic information sought spans multiple districts, requiring law enforcement to coordinate efforts with local law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts in multiple jurisdictions. At least one court has declined to issue a warrant under such circumstances because of the rule’s express territorial limits.

The Advisory Committee has proposed two changes to Rule 41 to address these concerns. A new proposed section, Rule 41(b)(6), sets out two circumstances under which a court may issue a warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage media, and to seize or copy information, even if the information is or may be located outside of the district. Second, Rule 41(f)(1)(c) would be amended to include language indicating the process for providing notice of a remote access search.
The Federal Bar Council believes that, on balance, these amendments are necessary and will be effective in permitting law enforcement to investigate crimes involving computers and electronic information. Rule 41’s territorial limits present unique problems for investigations requiring access to electronic information or storage devices. For instance, sophisticated software may be used to mask the location of a computer or electronic storage device. In this situation, law enforcement may be prevented from identifying the district in which electronic information or an electronic device is located in an otherwise sufficiently detailed warrant. Law enforcement efforts may likewise be thwarted or delayed by complex criminal schemes that involve the use of multiple computers in multiple districts simultaneously. Under the current Rule 41, investigating such schemes may require the government to expend extraordinary resources and efforts to coordinate obtaining individual warrants from the various districts involved. Both of these problems have become more common as crimes involving the use of computers have increased in frequency and complexity.

Under the proposed amendments, investigators could obtain a warrant to remotely install software on a target device to determine the true IP address or identifying information for that device, but only if that location of the device or information has been concealed by technological means. The Council understands that the ACLU has submitted comments to the Advisory Committee objecting to this type of remote access. The Council’s Federal Criminal Practice Committee has reviewed the ACLU’s objections and concluded that the use of remote access techniques is appropriate under the narrow circumstances outlined in the proposed rule.

The proposed amendments leave unanswered a number of constitutional questions, such as the level of specificity required in a warrant seeking authorization to conduct a remote access search or seizure. The Council believes, however, that these questions can and will be addressed by the courts in due course. The Advisory Committee has explicitly recognized this gap—and the need for the courts to fill it—in the comments to the proposed rule.

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In conclusion, the Federal Bar Council supports the proposed amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 4 and 41, and believes that they effectively and fairly address the issues presented by the current versions of the rules as discussed above. We recommend that the Advisory Committee solicit the support approval of the proposed amendments from the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.